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Summary 
Sexual crimes against women have always been a part of war and have 
occurred in virtually every armed conflict throughout human history. For a 
very long time, and still today in some cultures, women were not seen as 
equal to men. Thus, gender based crimes against women were almost 
invisible to international criminal law. While these crimes were largely 
ignored after World War I and II, things have recently started changing for 
the better. This change started in the 1990’s with the establishment of the 
ICTY and ICTR, as the first international criminal tribunals which had a 
mission to also punish crimes against women. These tribunals were the first 
ones that explicitly included rape as a crime against humanity in their 
statutes and their jurisprudence is of crucial importance for the prosecution 
of gender based crimes against women. The ICTR in Akayesu provided the 
first definition of rape in international criminal law and set the precedent 
that rape could constitute genocide. The ICTY in Kunarac expanded the 
definition of rape and also became the first international criminal tribunal to 
convict a perpetrator for enslavement for sexual reasons (sexual slavery). 
The ICC further continued the work of the ad hoc tribunals and expanded 
the list of gender based crimes against women by including in its statute 
several crimes that had never before been explicitly criminalized. Similarly, 
the SCSL became the first international criminal tribunal to explicitly 
recognize forced marriage as a crime against humanity. This thesis aims to 
widen the knowledge of this issue and provide an overview and analysis of 
the treatment of gender based crimes against women in international 
criminal law. 
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Preface 
As someone whose childhood was tarnished by the horrors of war in 
besieged Sarajevo, I never thought that I would be able to read or write 
about war. But as someone personally affected by such events, I felt it 
necessary to read numerous reports, testimonies and judgments to 
understand the factors motivating human beings to commit some of the 
worst crimes possible. While it was, at times, disturbing and heartbreaking, I 
am happy that I chose this topic as it has provided me with the inspiration 
and drive to assist efforts to increase protections for women during armed 
conflict.  
This thesis is the final product of the Master’s programme in International 
Human Rights Law at Lund University. Those two years were the best of 
my life with many wonderful people from all over the world. I not only have 
my diploma as a reminder of my time there, but something even more 
important and valuable: experiences and friendships that will last forever.  
Several persons contributed to this thesis, in many different ways. First of 
all, my supervisor Ms. Iryna Marchuk, an extremely supportive and very 
knowledgeable professor who guided me from the beginning of the thesis-
writing process. Her input and comments were invaluable and I am 
extremely grateful for all her guidance and help throughout the process. 
Secondly, I would like to say a huge thank you to the Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute (RWI) and all its personnel, led by Ms Marie Tuma, who have 
given us a wonderful environment and resources to work with. A special 
thank you also goes out to Lena Olsson and everyone from RWI library that 
gave us access to the wonderful books that we used during the whole master 
programme. 
I must also mention my classmates who helped me in many ways 
throughout my master’s programme and during the writing of my thesis, 
especially Oshni Arachchi who was always there for me with great advice 
and a helping hand. 
Of course, I could never forget my wonderful family: my incredible parents, 
my fantastic sister and my amazing best friend Lea for their love, help and 
endless support. Even though they were miles away I always felt as if they 
were by my side. And the person without whose support this thesis would 
never have happened and who has stood by my side for many years. Words 
cannot express the gratitude I owe you, my love! You have always being 
there for me, always believed in me and encouraged me. Thank you. 529   
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Finally, it is important to mention that I started an internship at the ICTY 
immediately after my Master’s programme ended, before I had fully 
finished my thesis and before I had successfully defended it. In my work at 
the ICTY I continued dealing with sexual violence in international criminal 
law and learned even more about this topic.  
At the ICTY I have worked with many brilliant lawyers, analysts and other 
(non-legal) experts who have jointly contributed to broadening my 
knowledge in this field and this invaluable experience will, no doubt, play 
important part in my future professional life. 
Thank you all! 
Irma 
 
 4 
Abbreviations 
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1. Introduction  
War has existed as long as mankind and has been an integral part of human 
history. War and conflict are perhaps even a part of human nature itself. 
Every war inevitably leads to death, suffering and destruction. It has no 
winners: when war is waged, everyone loses. 
The suffering endured by the civilian population in armed conflicts is not 
always the same and may vary from one victimized group to another. 
Gender can be an important factor when considering the effects of armed 
conflicts on persons: although everyone suffers, men and women generally 
suffer in different ways. While men are more likely to be killed or captured, 
women are much more likely to be subjected to rape and to suffer other 
sexual violence or to be displaced or deported as refugees.
1
  
This master thesis will focus on the suffering of women during an armed 
conflict, more precisely on gender-based crimes that are committed against 
women, such as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
forced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence. These types of 
violence towards women have occurred in every armed conflict throughout 
world history, and many women are subject to violence even during 
peacetime. For a long time women were not seen as equal to men and not 
much attention was given to sexual violence and crimes against women in 
international criminal tribunals, such as the ones after World War II, even 
though rape and forced prostitution were widespread during the war.
2
 
However, in recent years more attention has been paid to gender based 
crimes against women due to the developments in international criminal law 
by specific ad hoc tribunals (that is the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda), the International Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone. These developments are very welcome and very important. 
However, even more attention and effort needs to be paid to these issues, for 
several reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to make it absolutely clear that 
crimes of sexual violence are no longer ignored and will not go without 
punishment. Hopefully, this will eventually lead to the reduction of 
                                                 
   
1
  Brammertz, Serge and Jarvis, Michelle: “Lessons Learned in Prosecuting Gender Crimes 
under International Law: Experiences from the ICTY” in ed Eboe-Osuji, Chile: “Protecting 
Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay” 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 2010), page 93, at page 99 
   
2
  Phelps, Andrea: “Gender-based war crimes: Incidence and effectiveness of international 
criminal prosecution”, William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law Volume 12, Issue 
2 (2006), page 499, at page 512 
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occurrences of crimes of sexual violence during armed conflict, as 
perpetrators become aware that sexual violence is not simply a part of war 
and that they will be held accountable for their acts. Secondly, when sexual 
violence crimes do occur it is necessary to establish mechanisms on how to 
most efficiently help the victims with their trauma and assist them in finding 
justice. While great advances have been made in this regard, even more can 
and should be done. Therefore, my thesis will focus on the jurisprudence of 
international criminal tribunals regarding gender based crimes against 
women. 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this master thesis is to provide a legal analysis of the 
jurisprudence and developments in the area of gender-based crimes against 
women and, if possible, find lacunae in the law and provide 
recommendations on how it can be further improved. I will also attempt to 
reveal the intricacies which surround this complex area of international 
criminal law by scrutinizing the practice and jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals (ICTY and ICTR), the ICC as well as the SCSL. 
While much has been written about gender based violence against women, 
the position of women (in general and during armed conflict) has not 
improved: the fact is that gender based violence against women is still very 
widespread and is a part of virtually all armed conflicts in the world. 
Therefore, I believe more academic discussion, legal analysis and research 
is necessary about these issues, especially considering the discussion about 
potentially introducing new crimes to this area of law (such as forced 
marriage). While gender based crimes against women will likely never be 
completely eradicated from armed conflicts, putting greater focus on these 
issues is crucial for preventing and reducing these horrible crimes.  
1.2 Methodology and materials 
In the research and writing of this master thesis I shall rely mostly on the 
traditional legal method. This will be used in order to explore and interpret 
the case law of the relevant international criminal courts and tribunals 
regarding the topic of the thesis. This method will be used together with a 
gender-oriented perspective, as the thesis deals with issues which require the 
focus to be put on gender related issues specific to women. I will also 
compare the similarities and differences between the jurisprudence of the 
different international criminal law tribunals, as well as their statutes, and 
try to establish their approaches to gender based crimes against women and 
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thereby establish the current position of international criminal law regarding 
these crimes. 
In my thesis I will rely on academic writing and on the case law of 
international criminal tribunals, mostly of the ICTY and the ICTR. 
However, case law of other tribunals will be used as well, such as the 
relevant jurisprudence of the ICC and SCSL. Case law preceding the ad hoc 
tribunals, such as case law of the Tokyo and Nuremburg tribunals, might be 
briefly mentioned in order to offer a historical perspective as to the 
development of gender based crimes. 
I will also rely upon various international legal instruments, such as Statutes 
of the international criminal courts and tribunals and their rules of procedure 
and evidence, international conventions, UN Security Council Resolutions, 
relevant UN reports, etc. 
1.3 Delimitations 
This study is limited to the analysis of gender based crimes against women 
in the context of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
In international criminal law attention has also been devoted to gender based 
violence against male victims, which has become acknowledged on the 
same par as violence directed against women. However, this is a very 
complex issue which should be addressed separately and comprehensively. 
Therefore, it falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
Many modern international criminal courts and tribunals, as well as some 
national courts, deal with the prosecution of gender based violence against 
women. However, the focus of this thesis will only be on jurisprudence of 
the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and SCSL. Due to space limitations the thesis will not 
deal comprehensively with each individual crime. Instead, the thesis will 
provide a wider overview and reveal challenges which appear when dealing 
with gender based crimes against women.  
1.4 Structure 
This thesis is divided into several parts. The introductory part describes the 
historical development of gender based crimes in international criminal 
courts and tribunals and introduces definitions of legal terms relevant to 
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understand gender based crimes against women. It also outlines the 
applicable legal instruments.  
The main part of the thesis explores specific gender based crimes that occur 
in the context of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The 
specific crimes that are subject to the research inquiry are rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, any 
other form of sexual violence and forced marriage. 
Following the main part of the thesis is a section on procedural guarantees 
when prosecuting gender based crimes against women, including the 
protection of vulnerable victims and witnesses. These measures are 
generally applicable to all of the individual crimes listed in the thesis. 
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2. Historical development  
2.1 Introduction 
Sexual crimes against women have always been a part of war and armed 
conflict and they have occurred in probably every armed conflict in the 
world.
3
 For a very long time in history, and still today in some cultures, 
women were not seen as equal to men. They have been raped and sexually 
abused during wars, and often regarded as trophies of war and property of 
men given to soldiers to boost their morale.
4
 The approach of international 
criminal law towards gender based crimes against women can generally be 
divided into four historical periods. 
2.2 Prior to World War II 
Although many armed conflicts occurred in modern history prior to World 
War II and although crimes against women were committed in all of them, 
gender based crimes were not recognised in international law and largely 
went ignored. 
The 1907 Hague Convention,
5
 one of the major international humanitarian 
law instruments, does not include any explicit references to gender based 
crimes. However, the Hague Convention contained certain provisions which 
could be interpreted as applying to gender crimes, such as provisions on 
crimes against “family honour and rights.”6 This interpretation was not 
invoked in practice,
7
 and these provisions were not used for punishing 
crimes against women. Therefore, gender based crimes committed against 
women often went ignored and unpunished. 
                                                 
   
3
  Copleon, Rhonda: “Gender crimes as war crimes: integrating crimes against women into 
international criminal law”, McGill Law Journal Volume 46, Issue 1 (2000), page 217, at 
page 220 
   
4
  Palmer, Amy: “An evolutionary Analysis of gender-based war crimes and the continued 
tolerance of ‘forced marriage’”, Northwestern University Journal of International Human 
Rights Volume 7 (2009), page 128, at page 129 
   
5
  Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907, 
available at www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195 (20.09.2012) 
   
6
  Article 46 states “Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as 
well as religious convictions and practice must be respected” 
   
7
  Erb, Nicole Eva: “Gender-based crimes under the draft statute for the permanent 
International Criminal Court”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review Volume 29, Issue 
2(1997-1998), page 401, at page 407 
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2.3 World War II Tribunals 
After World War II, international criminal law witnessed many 
developments. In light of the widespread atrocities committed by the Nazi 
regime of Adolf Hitler, the Allied forces discussed the possibility of setting 
up a tribunal tasked with the adjudication of those crimes. In 1945, the 
representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union 
and France signed the London Agreement,
8
 which was later supported by 19 
other countries.
9
 By this Agreement the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal was created in order to bring to justice Nazi leaders who were 
guilty of core international crimes committed during World War II. In the 
course of the trial 22 persons were tried.
10
  
At the same time (1946), US Army General Douglas MacArthur, under the 
powers given to him by the Allied States, issued a special proclamation by 
which the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE or Tokyo 
IMT) was established. In its work the Tokyo IMT convicted 25 Japanese 
defendants for their role in World War II. Both Tribunals had the same 
mandate – to prosecute crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.
11
 Even though the tribunals had ample evidence that acts of 
sexual violence against women had been committed on a large scale and had 
the possibility to prosecute them as crimes against humanity or as war 
crimes, they failed to do so.  
However, the Tokyo Tribunal did prosecute the crime of rape and several 
Japanese officials were convicted for violations of laws and customs of war 
which included rape and sexual slavery. Even so, these crimes were only 
prosecuted alongside other war crimes or crimes against humanity, which 
meant that gender based crimes were not considered to be severe enough to 
stand alone.  
Hence, gender based crimes against women remained very under-
represented. Most notably, the systematic rape and sexual slavery by the 
Japanese imperial army of as many as 200 000 women was completely 
                                                 
   
8
  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945, 
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1945a.htm (20.09.2012)  
   
9
  Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Venezuela and Yugoslavia 
  
10
  Schabas, William A.; Bernaz, Nadia: “Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law” 
(Taylor & Francis: 2011), page 295 
  
11
  Ibid 
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ignored in the Tokyo trials.
12
 These women were referred to as “comfort 
women” and were forced to be prostitutes for Japanese soldiers as part of 
official government policy, for which the Japanese government accepted 
responsibility and apologized, but only in 1992.
13
  
Both tribunals mostly focused their attention on crimes against peace, not 
war crimes or crimes against humanity and especially not crimes against 
women. The reasons for not prosecuting gender-based crimes after World 
War II have been pondered over by many scholars. Some argue that women 
rarely had power or influence in those tribunals.
14
 Others argue that, after 
armed conflicts, it is generally considered more important to prosecute 
crimes which have death as their outcome.
15
 In any case, gender based 
crimes committed in World War II were not adequately prosecuted. 
Finally, as a result of the atrocities committed during World War II, in 1948 
one of the fundamental instruments of international criminal law was 
adopted, the Genocide Convention.
16
 It also remains largely silent regarding 
gender based crimes, as do its travaux preparatoires.
17
 It does not expressly 
list gender based crimes as amounting to genocide, although certain gender 
based crimes (such as forced abortion or forced sterilization) could be 
covered by the Genocide Convention, under Article 2(d) - imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group, and although in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals rape has been recognized as amounting 
to genocide when the requisite intent is fulfilled. 
These issues will be further explored below. 
                                                 
  
12
  Askin, Kelly Dawn: “A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International 
Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to 2003”, Human Rights Brief Volume 11, Issue 3 (2004), 
page 16 
  
13
  Brouwer de, Anne Marie: “Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The 
ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR” (Intersentia: 2005), page 8 
  
14
  Ibid 
  
15
  Haddad, Heidi Nichols: “Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the Yugoslav 
and Rwandan Tribunals”, Human Rights Review Volume 12, Issue 1 (2011), page 109, at 
page 112 
  
16
  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 
1948, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cppcg/cppcg.html (20.09.2012) 
  
17
  See, for example: Abtahi, Hirad and Webb, Philippa: “The genocide convention: the 
travaux préparatoires” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 2008) 
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2.4 ICTY and ICTR 
After the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, there was no progress in 
international criminal law for a long time with regards to gender based 
crimes. Further developments of the jurisprudence took place again in the 
1990’s following the bloodshed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the 
establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals for these countries 
(ICTY and ICTR).  
2.4.1 ICTY 
The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia prompted a series of armed 
conflicts in the beginning of the 1990’s. Mass atrocities took place and 
thousands of civilians were killed, wounded, expelled from their homes, 
tortured, sexually abused and held in detention camps. Therefore, the UN 
Security Council, acting within its mandate under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, adopted Resolution 827 and established the ICTY in 1993.
18
 
Although questions were raised about the legality of the UN Security 
Council resolution,
19
 the ICTY has been one of the key institutions shaping 
contemporary international criminal law.  
The tribunal’s mandate is to prosecute persons accused of: grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949; violations of the laws or customs of war; 
genocide; and crimes against humanity in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. 
The ICTY has indicted 161 persons for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
20
 
Before the establishment of the ICTY, various women’s groups exerted 
significant pressure in order to ensure prosecution of gender based crimes 
against women. They did not want these crimes to go unpunished, as was 
                                                 
  
18
  United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993; The main aim of the 
Security Council for establishing the ICTY was to “put an end to such crimes and take 
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them.” – 
Preamble of the Statute of the ICTY; The ICTY’s mandate is limited in time and it should 
conclude its work by 31
st
 December 2014. 
  
19
  ICTY, case IT-94-1 Prosecutor v Tadić (Prijedor), Trial Chamber Judgment of 7 May 1997 
  
20
  There are 35 ongoing proceedings for 35 accused (including appeal procedures), and the 
proceedings for 126 accused have been concluded. 78 individuals have been indicted for 
sexual violence crimes, and sexual violence was contained in 24 Judgments. – United 
Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Review of the sexual violence elements 
of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the 
light of Security Council Resolution 1820”, page 29, available at 
www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=123 (20.09.2012) 
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the case in previous conflicts.
21
 This pressure paid off and the ICTY, in its 
Statute, explicitly mentions rape as a crime against humanity for the first 
time in international criminal law.
22
 Furthermore, a number of developments 
occurred in the ICTY’s case law as well. In the Čelebići camp case23 the 
judges held that rape could constitute torture, which it reiterated in the 
Furundžija case.24 In the Kunarac case25 the ICTY issued the first 
indictment based solely on crimes of sexual violence against women. One of 
the accused, Kunarac, was also convicted of the enslavement of women, 
representing the first time that enslavement was charged as a crime of sexual 
violence (sexual slavery).
26
  
2.4.2 ICTR 
In 1994, around 800 000 people were killed in the armed conflict in Rwanda 
that waged for 100 days. Similarly to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, 
the conflict was a result of long-lasting tensions between ethnic groups, the 
Hutu and the Tutsi, where the Hutu turned against the Tutsi. The UN 
Security Council followed the same path as with the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia. In November 1994 it acted under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter and adopted Resolution 955, which established the ICTR.
27
 
According to its Statute, the ICTR is to prosecute persons who committed 
genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.
28
 
                                                 
  
21
  Green, Jennifer; Copelon, Rhoda; Cotter, Patrick and Stephens, Beth: “Affecting the Rules 
for the Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique”, 
Hastings Women's Law Journal, Volume 5, Issue 2 (1994), page 171, at page 176 
  
22
  ICTY Statute, Article 5(g) 
  
23
  ICTY, case IT-96-21 Prosecutor v Mucić et al. (Čelebići Camp), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 16 November 1998 
  
24
  ICTY, case IT-95-17/1 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Lašva Valley), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 10 December 1998 
  
25
  ICTY, case IT-96-23 & 23/1 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Foča), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 22 February 2001 
  
26
  Campanaro, Jocelyn: “Women, war and international law: the historical treatment of 
gender-based war crimes”, Georgetown Law Journal Volume 89, Issue 8 (2001), page 
2557, at page 2568 
  
27
  United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994; Similarly as with the 
ICTY, the aim of the ICTR was to prosecute those responsible for genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan citizens in the territory of neighbouring States. The court’s jurisdiction 
ratione temporis is limited to acts which occurred in the period between 1 January 1994 and 
31 December 1994; The ICTR has 72 completed cases, which includes 46 convictions, 10 
acquittals and 16 cases pending appeal. 1 case is still in progress. Source: 
www.unictr.org/Cases/StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (20.09.2012)  
  
28
  United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994 
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During the armed conflict, women in Rwanda were subjected to horrific 
crimes. They were raped, gang-raped, sexually tortured, held in slavery or 
sexually mutilated.
29
 Similarly to the ICTY, rape is also listed as a crime 
against humanity in the ICTR Statute.
30
 Since gender based crimes against 
women were so widespread in Rwanda, the ICTR even established the 
Sexual Assault Committee in 1996 in order to help it investigate all the 
reported cases.
 31
 
Regarding its case law, perhaps the most important sexual violence case in 
the ICTR is the Akayesu case;
32
 in which the accused Akayesu was 
convicted of crimes against humanity for acts of sexual assault and where it 
was established that sexual violence was an essential part of the genocide in 
Rwanda.
33
  
As with the ICTY, much was expected from the ICTR with regard to proper 
prosecution and punishment for gender based crimes. And indeed, these 
tribunals’ work had a very good beginning with some groundbreaking cases, 
such as Kunarac,
34
 Furundžija35 and Akayesu.36 However, the ICTY and 
ICTR have later been criticized for the subsequent stagnation in the 
investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender based violence and for 
their failure to fulfil the high expectations placed on them.
37
 
                                                 
  
29
  Human Rights Watch Report: “Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan 
Genocide and its Aftermath”, 1 September 1996, page 23, available at: www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/3ae6a8510.html (20 September 2012) 
  
30
  Statute of the ICTR, Article 3(g) 
  
31
  Human Rights Watch Report: “Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan 
Genocide and its Aftermath”, 1 September 1996, page 54, available at: www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/3ae6a8510.html (23 September 2012) 
  
32
  ICTR, case ICTR-96-4 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment of 2 September 
1998 
  
33
  Campanaro, Jocelyn: “Women, war and international law: the historical treatment of 
gender-based war crimes”, Georgetown Law Journal Volume 89, Issue 8 (2001), page 
2557, at page 2569 
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  ICTY, case IT-96-23 & 23/1 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Foča), Trial Chamber Judgment 
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  Human Rights Watch Report: Human Rights Watch World Report 2004 - In War as in 
Peace: Sexual Violence and Women's Status, 1 January 2004, available at 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/402bac094.html (20 September 2012) 
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2.5  SCSL 
In 1991 a civil war broke out in Sierra Leone when an armed group known 
as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) crossed over the border from 
Liberia in an attempt to overthrow the government of Sierra Leone. The 
civil war lasted 10 years during which many atrocities were committed 
against civilians, such as mass murders, rapes and sexual slavery. 
After the end of the civil war, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
was established by treaty between the government of Sierra Leone and the 
United Nations,
38
 upon request by the President of Sierra Leone. This led to 
the passing of a Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary-
General to enter into negotiations with Sierra Leone regarding such a 
court.
39
 In July 2002, the SCSL started its work. 
The SCSL is somewhat different from the other ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals: it is a treaty based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction 
and composition.
40
 The majority of judges and the Prosecutor are appointed 
by the Secretary-General, while the minority of judges and the Deputy 
Prosecutor are appointed by the government of Sierra Leone.
41
 The SCSL is 
not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, but it is also not part of the 
domestic legal system of Sierra Leone. It is a separate international 
institution with its own Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
42
 
The SCSL has jurisdiction to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
Sierra Leonean law committed in Sierra Leone since 1996.
43
 It has so far 
held three joint trials of nine accused (AFRC case,
44
 RUF case
45
 and CDF 
case
46
) and the trial of Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia.
47
 
                                                 
  
38
  Agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone on the 
establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed on 16 January 2002 
  
39
  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 of 14 August 2000 
  
40
  Secretary-General report on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN 
Doc.S/2000/915 of 4 October 2000, para. 9 
  
41
  Agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone on the 
establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed on 16 January 2002, Article 2. 
  
42
  Cryer, Friman and Robinson, Wilmshurst: “An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure”, (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2010), page 182 
  
43
  Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 1; The Court has jurisdiction to 
prosecute just crimes against humanity and war crimes, but not genocide; The provisions on 
crimes against humanity and war crimes are similar, but not identical, to the definitions in 
the ICTR. 
  
44
  SCSL, Case 16 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC case) 
  
45
  SCSL, Case SCSL-04-15 Prosecutor v Sessay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF case) 
  
46
  SCSL, Case SCSL-04-14 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa (CDF case) 
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Once appeal proceedings in the Taylor case are completed, the work of the 
SCSL will be concluded.  
2.6 ICC 
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court,
48
 the first 
permanent international criminal court in history, with a broader jurisdiction 
than that of the ad hoc tribunals (which were limited to a certain conflict on 
a certain territory for a certain period). 121 states have so far ratified the 
Rome Statute.
49
 The ICC has jurisdiction over the same crimes as the ad hoc 
tribunals, in particular war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
50
 
However, an addition to the jurisdiction of the ICC is the crime of 
aggression over which jurisdiction can be exercised only after 01 July 
2017.
51
 With respect to other crimes, the ICC has jurisdiction if the offences 
were committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute.
52
  
The jurisdiction of the ICC is not intended to replace that of national courts 
but to complement them,
53
 meaning that the ICC can only exercise 
jurisdiction if States are unable or unwilling to prosecute crimes 
themselves.
54
 Moreover, the ICC may only exercise its jurisdiction after the 
Prosecutor (pending authorisation by the Pre-Trial Chamber) opens an 
investigation or after a state party refers the case to the Prosecutor.
55
 A case 
can also be referred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council.
56
 
                                                                                                                            
  
47
  SCSL, Case SCSL 03-01 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor; On 26 April 2012, after a very high 
profile trial, Charles Taylor was found guilty on all counts of the Indictment, and on         
30 May 2012 he was sentenced to 50 years in prison. The Judgment has been appealed by 
both the Prosecutor and Defence.  
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  The Rome Statute is an international treaty that which was adopted in 1998 but only came 
into force on 01 July 2002.  
  
49
  Source: www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (20 September 2012) 
  
50
  Rome Statute, Article 5 
  
51
  This is subject to approval at the next ICC Review Conference. Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute, Resolution RC/Res.6 – The Crime of Aggression, available at www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/resolutions/rc-res.6-eng.pdf (20.09.2012) 
  
52
  Rome Statute, Article 11; Up to 20 September 2012 the court had started 16 cases in 7 
situations (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur - Sudan, Central African 
Republic, Republic of Kenya, Libya and Cote d’Ivoire). 
  
53
  Brouwer de, Anne Marie: “Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The 
ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR” (Intersentia: 2005), page 20 
  
54
  Rome Statute, Article 17 
  
55
  In such situations either the state where the act occurred or the state of nationality of the 
accused must be party to the Rome Statute (or accept jurisdiction by a Declaration) for the 
Court to have jurisdiction. 
  
56
  In which case it is not necessary for the state where the act occurred or the state of 
nationality of the accused to be party to the Rome Statute – Rome Statute, Articles 12 to 16  
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Another important characteristic of the ICC legal framework is the existence 
of the Elements of Crimes, a non-binding document containing legal 
elements of each crime which are designed to assist the Court in the 
interpretation and application of legal provisions on war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide.
57
  
As to the developments in the prosecution of gender based crimes, it must 
be noted that the ICC made significant steps forward and was the first 
international criminal court to define rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced sterilization as 
separate and distinct war crimes and crimes against humanity.
58
 This focus 
on gender issues was a result of strong lobbying by over 200 women’s 
organizations when the Rome Statute was drafted.
59
 
                                                 
  
57
  Rome Statute, Article 9 
  
58
  Brouwer de, Anne Marie: “Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The 
ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR” (Intersentia: 2005), page 21 
  
59
  Ibid, page 20 
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3. Definition of gender and 
contextual elements 
3.1 Introduction  
As stated in previous chapters, gender based crimes are recognized in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and in the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc intentional courts and tribunals. This jurisprudence deals with 
gender based crimes as crimes against humanity (particularly rape and 
sexual slavery),
60
 war crimes and genocide. Before discussing specific 
crimes, it is necessary to first define what is meant by gender based crimes 
against women and to then describe the contextual elements of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide, in order to avoid repetition 
when assessing the specific crimes dealt with by this thesis.  
3.2 Definition of gender based crimes 
against women 
Gender based crimes are result of gender based violence. Though there are 
many connotations of gender based violence in national criminal laws and 
human rights law, there is a disagreement and lack of precision over the 
definitions of gender based crimes in international criminal law.  
The term “violence” is normally understood as “the intentional use of 
physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another 
person or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high 
likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-
development or deprivation.”61 The term “gender” is in the United Nations 
often used as a synonym to the word “women”.62  
                                                 
  
60
  See eg. Oosterveld, Valerie: “Gender-Based Crimes Against Humanity” in ed Sadat, Leila 
Nadya: “Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity” (Cambridge University 
Press: 2011), page 78  
  
61
  World Health Organization, World Report on Violence and Health, page 5, available at 
www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/ (20.09.2012) 
  
62
  Oosterveld, Valerie: “Gender-Based Crimes Against Humanity” in ed Sadat, Leila Nadya: 
“Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity” (Cambridge University Press: 2011), 
page 78, at page 78 
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However, gender can also be seen as a wider concept than just “women”, as 
gender is not the same as sex.
63
 The UN Office of the Special Adviser on 
Gender Issues outlines gender as “the social attributes and opportunities 
associated with being male and female and the relationships between 
women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women 
and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships 
are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. 
They are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is 
expected, allowed and valued in a women or a man in a given context.”64 
In international criminal law, specifically in the Rome Statute, the term 
gender “refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of the 
society.”65 When gender based crimes occur in the context of genocide, an 
armed conflict or a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian 
population, the first crime that comes to mind is rape. Having said that, 
there is a greater diversity of sexual and non-sexual gender based crimes 
directed against women i.e. sexual slavery, forced prostitution and forced 
marriage.  
The recent report of the UN Security Council provides a definition of sexual 
violence related to armed conflict as “incidents or patterns [...] of sexual 
violence, that is rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity against women, men or children. Such incidents or patterns occur in 
conflict or post-conflict settings or other situations of concern (e.g. political 
strife). They also have a direct or indirect nexus with the conflict or political 
strife itself, that is, a temporal, geographical and/or causal link.”66 
Therefore, it can be said that gender based violence is violence that targets 
women or men because of their sex and/or their socially constructed gender 
roles. Sexual violence is often systematic and is carried out with the purpose 
of destabilising populations and destroying bonds within communities and 
families, advancing ethnic-cleansing, expressing hatred for the enemy, or 
supplying combatants with sexual services.  
                                                 
  
63
  Oosterveld, Valerie: “Gender-Based Crimes Against Humanity” in ed Sadat, Leila Nadya: 
“Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity” (Cambridge University Press: 2011), 
page 78, at page 79 
  
64
  www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm (20.09.2012) 
  
65
  ICC Rome Statute, Article 7(3) 
  
66
  UN Secretary-General, Conflict-related sexual violence: report of the Secretary-General, 
13 January 2012, A/66/657*–S/2012/33*, para 3, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/4f27a19c2.html (20 September 2012) 
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3.3 Contextual elements of crimes 
against humanity, genocide and    
war crimes 
Crimes under international criminal law exist only when the criminal acts 
are committed in a certain context. This means that certain contextual 
elements must exist in order for an act to be considered as a crime against 
humanity, war crime or an act of genocide and not, for example, an 
“ordinary” act of murder or rape which would not come within the scope of 
international criminal law. Contextual elements are those elements (or 
circumstances) that are common to all underlying crimes against humanity, 
war crimes or acts of genocide that characterize them as international 
crimes. Only when these common contextual elements exist will the specific 
elements concerning each of the specific crimes be assessed and analyzed.  
3.3.1 Crimes against humanity 
Given that the contextual elements for crimes against humanity are well 
established in the jurisprudence of international criminal courts and 
tribunals, there is no need to examine them in detail in this thesis. It is 
sufficient to remind the reader what contextual elements have to be 
established for acts to constitute crimes against humanity. These elements 
separate international crimes from ordinary criminal acts, such as murder 
due to jealousy or ordinary theft, which are not of concern to the 
international community and are outside the scope of international criminal 
law.  
These elements are listed in the ICC Elements of Crimes, in Article 7: 
3.  The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population. 
4.  The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population. 
Regarding the first element, an attack usually involves the use of armed 
force. However the element can also encompass any mistreatment of 
civilian population even where there is no use of armed force.
67
 The 
                                                 
  
67
  ICTY, case IT-96-23 & 23/1 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Foča), Appeal Chamber 
Judgment of 12 June 2002, para 86; ICTR, case ICTR-96-4 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial 
Chamber Judgment of 02 September 1998, para 581; ICC Elements of Crimes, Crimes 
against humanity – Introduction, para 3 
 21 
widespread or systematic test is not cumulative; it is sufficient to establish 
that an attack existed and that it was either widespread or systematic. The 
“widespread” element generally denotes a large scale of the attack and 
number of victims,
68
 which is assessed on a case-by-case basis. The term 
“systematic” reflects a high degree of organization that features, among 
others, patterns, continuous commission, use of resources, as well as 
planning and political objectives.
69
 
Furthermore, the attack must be directed against “any civilian population” 
regardless of nationality. The term “civilian” denotes that the attack is 
directed towards non-combatants, while the term “population” denotes that a 
larger number of persons are subject to the attack, rather than isolated acts 
against individuals. The civilian population must be the primary object of 
the attack which means that attacks directed against legitimate military 
objectives would not qualify as crimes against humanity.
70
  
In order to find a person guilty of crimes against humanity, a link must exist 
between the accused person and the attack. In brief, not only must the act of 
the accused objectively fall within context of the broader attack, but also 
he/she must be aware of the broader context. As the ICTY stated: “Thus to 
convict an accused of crimes against humanity, it must be proved that the 
crimes were related to the attack on a civilian population (occurring during 
an armed conflict) and that the accused knew that his crimes were so 
related.”71  
The ICTY held that awareness, wilful blindness or knowingly taking a risk 
that the act is a part of an attack would be sufficient to establish the 
connection between the perpetrator and the attack.
72
 While it is not clear 
whether the ICC will completely follow the ICTY’s lead, it is likely that the 
standard for establishing awareness will not be high, as it is not necessary 
that the perpetrator had detailed knowledge of the act or its characteristics. 
The perpetrator’s awareness can be inferred from relevant facts and 
                                                 
  
68
  ICTY, case IT-94-1 Prosecutor v Tadić (Prijedor), Trial Chamber Judgment of 07 May 
1997, para 206; ICTY, case IT-96-23 & 23/1 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Foča), Trial 
Chamber Judgment of 22 February 2001, para 428; ICTR, case ICTR-96-11 Prosecutor v 
Nahimana, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 28 November 2007, para 920; ICC, case ICC-
02/05-01/09, Prosecutor v al Bashir, First Arrest Warrant of 04 March 2009, para 81 
  
69
  Cryer, Friman and Robinson, Wilmshurst: “An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure”, (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2010), page 237 
  
70
  Ibid, pages 241-242 
  
71
  ICTY, case IT-94-1 Prosecutor v Tadić (Prijedor), Appeal Chamber Judgment of 15 July 
1999, para 271; ICTR, case ICTR-97-20 Prosecutor v Semanza, Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 15 May 2003, para 326 
  
72
  Cryer, Friman and Robinson, Wilmshurst: “An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure”, (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2010), page 244 
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circumstances, and in the vast majority of cases the existence of a 
widespread and systematic attack would be notoriously known and could 
not be reasonably denied by the perpetrator.
73
 
Finally, it should be noted that for crimes against humanity to exist, there is 
no need to prove a nexus to armed conflict, although the practice of the 
international criminal tribunals is not fully consistent regarding this issue. 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals required a 
nexus to war crimes or aggression (that is to an armed conflict), as did the 
Statute of the ICTY.
74
 However, this element was subsequently omitted in 
the ICTR and ICC Statutes. Nowadays it is well settled that a nexus to 
armed conflict is not required for crimes against humanity and the Statute of 
the ICTY is only an exception or anomaly in that regard.
75
 This was also 
confirmed by the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which admits that the 
requirement of a nexus to armed conflict is no longer necessary in 
customary international law, but that it was, nonetheless, included in the 
Statute and must exist in cases before the ICTY.
76
    
Similarly, there is no requirement of a discriminatory intent, that is that the 
crimes against humanity are committed on national, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds. Such provisions were included only in the Statute of the 
ICTR,
77
 but not in the Statutes of the ICTY or ICC, or other hybrid tribunals 
(SCSL for example). Therefore, these provisions in the ICTR Statute are 
also an exception to the rule. 
3.3.2 War Crimes  
The provisions of the Rome Statute on war crimes which are relevant for 
this thesis (as they contain sexual crimes) are Articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e), 
which deal with “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict” in international and non-
international armed conflicts respectively. 
                                                 
  
73
  Cryer, Friman and Robinson, Wilmshurst: “An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure”, (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2010), page 244 
  
74
  Article 5 of the Statute states that the ICTY has the power to prosecute persons for crimes 
against humanity “committed in armed conflict” 
  
75
  Cryer, Friman and Robinson, Wilmshurst: “An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure”, (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2010), page 235 
  
76
  See, for example, ICTY, case IT-94-1 Prosecutor v Tadić (Prijedor), Trial Chamber 
Judgment of 7 May 1997, para 627 and Appeal Chamber Judgment of 15 July 1999, paras 
282-288 
  
77
  ICTR Statute, Article 3 
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In the ICC Elements of Crimes, all crimes under these provisions have two 
common elements (with the only difference being in the first of the two 
elements below regarding international or non-international armed conflict): 
1.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
international armed conflict.
78
 
[1.  The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
armed conflict not of an international character.] 
79
 
2.  The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established 
the existence of an armed conflict.
80
 
It must be noted that not every crime committed during an armed conflict 
amounts to a war crime. A murder committed on the ground of jealousy or 
between neighbours over land, for example, will not constitute a war crime 
even if it is committed during an international or internal armed conflict. 
The formulation “in the context of and was associated with” is meant to 
distinguish war crimes from ordinary criminal behaviour.
81
 
Regarding the first element, the term “in the context of” an armed conflict 
refers to the temporal and geographic scope: the conduct occurred during an 
armed conflict and on a territory in which there is armed conflict. The term 
“associated with” refers to the nexus between the conduct and the conflict, 
meaning that the conduct must be closely related to the armed conflict.
82
 
International armed conflicts are defined under common Article 2 of the 
Geneva Conventions.
83
 They are defined as “all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them” and as “all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance.” The ICTY stated that an international armed conflict “exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States.”84 It also clarified 
that “[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the 
                                                 
  
78
  For Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute 
  
79
  For Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute 
  
80
  Identical for Article 8(2)(b) and (8)(2)(e) of the Rome Statute 
  
81
  Dörmann, Knut: “Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Sources and Commentary” (Cambridge University Press: 2004), page 19 
  
82
  Cryer, Friman and Robinson, Wilmshurst: “An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure”, (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2010), page 285 
  
83
  Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, available at www.icrc.org/eng/war-
and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp (20.09.2012) 
  
84
  ICTY, case IT-94-1 Prosecutor v Tadić (Prijedor), Decision on the defence motion for 
interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, para 70 
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intervention of members of the armed forces is an international armed 
conflict and [i]t makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how 
much slaughter takes place.”85 
“Non-international armed conflicts” are armed conflicts that take place in 
the territory of a state when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups. Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome statute defines non-international armed 
conflicts as “armed conflicts not of an international character and [...] [not] 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.” These examples 
are used to distinguish non-international armed conflicts from other forms 
of violence which are not covered by international humanitarian law.
86
 
Whether a situation will be characterized as a non-international armed 
conflict, as internal disturbances or merely as tensions will generally depend 
on the intensity (or protracted duration
87
) of the conflict and organization of 
the parties.
88
 
As for the temporal and geographic scope of the conflict and protection 
offered by international humanitarian law, international humanitarian law 
will apply from the initiation of the conflict until a general conclusion of 
peace is reached. It applies to the whole territory of the Parties of the 
conflict or the territory under their control (in the case of non-international 
conflicts). However there are exceptions, as set out by certain provisions 
that are bound to hostilities and a limited territorial scope.
89
 
Regarding the second element, there is no need for the perpetrator to 
conduct a legal evaluation on whether an armed conflict exists and what its 
type is, nor must he be aware of the facts that established the conflict. All 
that is required is his awareness of factual circumstances that establish the 
existence of an armed conflict.
90
 While the language is less than clear, this 
suggests that the perpetrator only needs to know the nexus between his/her 
acts and the armed conflict to a lower standard than that of Article 30 of the 
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  ICTY, case IT-96-21 Prosecutor v Mucić et al (Čelebići camp), Trial Chamber Judgment of 
16 November 1998, para 208 
  
86
  Dörmann, Knut: “Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Sources and Commentary” (Cambridge University Press: 2004), page 385 
  
87
  ICTY, case IT-96-21 Prosecutor v Mucić et al (Čelebići camp), Trial Chamber Judgment of 
16 November 1998, para 184 
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  ICTY, case IT-94-1 Prosecutor v Tadić (Prijedor), Trial Chamber Judgment of 07 May 
1997, para 562 
  
89
  Dörmann, Knut: “Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Sources and Commentary” (Cambridge University Press: 2004),          
pages 24-25 
  
90
  ICC Elements of Crimes, Article 8 – Introduction  
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Rome Statute, and in most cases proving the nexus objectively will be 
sufficient.
91
 This issue is mostly theoretical, since it is difficult to imagine 
situations where the conduct of the perpetrator would have a nexus to the 
conflict, but the perpetrator wouldn’t have awareness of the surrounding 
armed conflict.
92
 
3.3.3 Genocide 
Contrary to crimes against humanity, the definition of contextual elements 
for genocide is still a controversial and problematic issue. Genocide is 
defined in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention,
93
 which states that “[...] 
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” 
This same definition was transposed, verbatim, to the Statutes of the ICTY, 
ICTR and ICC. Unlike crimes against humanity, the definition of genocide 
does not contain an additional contextual element which relates to 
circumstances in which the prohibited act constitutes genocide. The 
contextual element was implicitly introduced in the ICC Elements of 
Crimes, which specify that “the conduct took place in the context of a 
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was 
conduct that could itself effect such destruction.”94 
This contextual element encompasses two different situations: the first is 
where the individual accused of genocide commits the acts as part of a 
wider context in which other perpetrators are also committing acts of 
genocide (or crimes against humanity). This would be the most likely 
method of carrying out genocide. The second, less common, situation is 
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  Dörmann, Knut: “Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Sources and Commentary” (Cambridge University Press: 2004),          
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  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, available at 
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  ICC Elements of Crimes, Article 6 – Genocide  
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where the individual committing genocide can himself/herself effect the 
destruction of the targeted group, without the need for a wider pattern of 
similar genocidal conduct.
95
 This would be, for example, if an individual 
had access to nuclear or chemical weapons using which they could commit 
genocide. Therefore, under these contextual elements, acts which do not 
cause a real or concrete threat to the existence of the targeted group or part 
thereof would not constitute genocide,
96
 for example when isolated crimes 
are committed against a protected group but do not objectively have the 
possibility of destroying the group or part of it. 
Contextual elements of the crime of genocide are not explicitly laid down in 
the Statutes of the ICTY or the ICTR. However, they could be inferred from 
the ICTR judgement in Akeyasu
97
 and the ICTY Trial Judgement in Krštić.98 
However, the Krštić Appeals Chamber dismissed the necessity to prove 
contextual elements of genocide, arguing that they do not appear in the 
Genocide Convention and are not part of customary international law.
99
 
Therefore, the ICTY judges ruled out the contextual element as a 
constitutive element of genocide in its jurisprudence. 
On the contrary, however, the ICC has relied upon the definition of 
genocide as set out in the Elements of Crimes and applied the contextual 
elements of genocide in the Al Bashir Arrest Warrant case. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber stated that these contextual elements were not contrary to the 
Statute of the ICC and its definition of genocide (and, hence, that they were 
not contrary to the Genocide Convention).
100
 Therefore, it seems that in 
future proceedings contextual elements will be applied by the ICC to the 
crime of genocide, contrary to previous jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals. This seems quite justified if genocide is to be distinguished from 
“lesser” crimes and to be considered as the most serious crime that can be 
committed.  
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3.4 State or organizational policy 
3.4.1 Crimes against Humanity 
A controversial aspect, which has been at the heart of debate, is whether 
state or organizational policy is a requirement for crimes against humanity, 
that is whether there must be an underlying governmental or organizational 
policy that directs, instigates or encourages the crimes.
101
 Some authorities 
have supported such a requirement, while others have rejected it. 
This element cannot be found in the Statute of the ICTY. The Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY held in the Kunarac case, in no uncertain terms, that a 
state or organizational plan or policy is not an independent element of the 
crime against humanity, although it can be relevant to establish the other 
(required) elements of crimes against humanity: “[N]either the attack nor 
the acts of the accused needs to be supported by any form of ‘policy’ or 
‘plan’. There was nothing in the Statute or in customary international law at 
the time of the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan 
or policy to commit these crimes [...]. [P]roof that the attack was directed 
against a civilian population and that it was widespread or systematic are 
legal elements of the crime. To prove these elements, it is not necessary to 
show that they were the result of the existence of a policy or plan. It may be 
useful in establishing that the attack was directed against a civilian 
population and that it was widespread or systematic (especially the latter) 
to show that there was in fact a policy or plan, but it may be possible to 
prove these things by reference to other matters. Thus, the existence of a 
policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, but it is not a legal element of 
the crime.”102 
On the other hand, the need for a state or organizational policy to exist is 
expressly recognized in the Statute of the ICC. Article 7(2)(a) states: 
“‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 
1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy to commit such attack.” (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the Elements of Crimes expand the above statement: 
“‘[P]olicy to commit such attack’ requires that the State or organization 
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actively promote or encourage such an attack against civilian 
population.”103  
The ICC, while taking note of the jurisprudence of the ICTY,
104
 confirmed 
the requirement of a state or organizational policy in several decisions. In 
Katanga and Chui the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC stated that this element 
“ensures that the attack, even if carried out over a large geographical area 
or directed against a large number of victims, must still be thoroughly 
organised and follow a regular pattern. It must also be conducted in 
furtherance of a common policy involving public or private resources. Such 
a policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a specific 
territory or by any organisation with the capability to commit a widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population. The policy need not be 
explicitly defined by the organisational group. Indeed, an attack which is 
planned, directed or organised - as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts 
of violence - will satisfy this criterion.”105 
Moreover, in the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya Decision, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber expressly listed all 
the elements of crimes against humanity, including the state or 
organizational policy element. Having relied upon the case law of the ICTY, 
it further clarified that “policy does not necessarily need to have been 
conceived at the highest level of the State machinery. Hence, a policy 
adopted by regional or even local organs of the State could satisfy the 
requirement of a State policy. [...] With regard to the term ‘organizational’ 
the Chamber notes that the Statute is unclear as to the criteria pursuant to 
which a group may qualify as ‘organization’ [...]. Whereas some have 
argued that only State-like organizations may qualify, the Chamber opines 
that the formal nature of a group and the level of its organization should not 
be the defining criterion. Instead, as others have convincingly put forward, 
a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the capability to 
perform acts which infringe on basic human values. [...] The Chamber thus 
determines that organizations not linked to a State may, for the purposes of 
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the Statute, elaborate and carry out a policy to commit an attack against a 
civilian population.”106 
Although the ICC jurisprudence explicitly recognizes a state or 
organizational policy as a requisite element of crimes against humanity, the 
situation is not entirely clear and disagreement exists. The issue of a state or 
organizational policy to commit an attack on civilian population is at the 
core of the Kenyan cases. The judges agreed that even non-state actors can 
satisfy the state or organizational policy requirement. However, 
disagreement evolved around the criteria that should be applied to non-state 
actors as well as the question whether state actors may adopt an 
organizational policy. The majority of judges took an expansive view of the 
term “organization” in Article 7(1)(b). In the Tadić case, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber found that both state and non-state actors can be behind the attacks 
in crimes against humanity: “[T]he law in relation to crimes against 
humanity has developed to take into account forces which, although not 
those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able 
to move freely within, defined territory.”107 
The above Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC was endorsed by 
the Majority, with Judge Hans-Peter Kaul dissenting. In his opinion, the 
post-election violence in Kenya could not fall under crimes against 
humanity, as the contextual element of the state or organizational policy 
requirement had not been met. In his Dissenting opinion Judge Kaul 
rejected the position that any non-state actor may qualify as an 
“organization” and considered that only state-like organizations fell within 
the term “organizational policy” in Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute: “I 
read the provision such that the juxtaposition of the notions ‘State’ and 
‘organization’ in article 7(2)(a) of the Statute are an indication that even 
though the constitutive elements of statehood need not be established those 
‘organizations’ should partake of some characteristics of a State. Those 
characteristics eventually turn the private ‘organization’ into an entity 
which may act like a State or has quasi-State abilities.”108  
According to Judge Kaul, in such situations (of an organization conducting 
a policy of violence) it is precisely this state-like character of the 
organization which elevates the crimes to an international level, instead of 
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being purely national crimes.
109
 His approach to crimes against humanity 
was based on the understanding that only the state or state-like entities are 
capable of implementing policies to carry out such violence. However, in 
many countries individuals with access to resources may organize and 
implement atrocities similar to the state organised crimes against humanity. 
There were many examples how different rebel groups, clan leaders or other 
non-state actors and sometimes even state agencies on behalf of specific 
leaders may organise serious abuses against civilians, as was the case with 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Somalia, the Central African 
Republic and other places where there was an absence of efficient and 
legitimate state structure.
110
 According to the majority in the Kenyan 
Decision, such groups would be considered as organizations under Article 
7(2)(a) without the need to be state-like. However, even according to Judge 
Kaul’s approach, such organizations could perhaps be considered as state-
like, although the threshold is set higher. 
Therefore, we can see that there is disagreement among international 
criminal tribunals about the requirement for a state or organizational policy 
as a contextual element of crimes against humanity. In spite of the fact that 
the ICTY did not recognise such policy as a contextual element of crimes 
against humanity, one may argue that the ICC has, through the codification 
of customary international law and documentation of states’ opinio juris, 
established state or organizational policy as a necessary element of the 
crime. Additional support for this view may be taken from critical 
commentary of the ICTY approach, some of which claimed that the ICTY 
analysis of the state or organizational policy element in international 
customary law was rather superficial and that it was more the result of a 
political decision than a legal analysis.
111
 
Regarding the state or organizational policy requirement, it should be noted 
that the jurisprudence has established that a policy does not need to be 
formally adopted, nor does it have to be expressly declared, nor stated 
clearly and precisely.
112
 Furthermore, the state or organizational policy 
element may be satisfied by inference from the manner in which the acts 
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occur, for example by showing the improbability of the incidences being 
random occurrences. Moreover, it is not required to show any actual action 
by a state or organization, as this requirement can be satisfied by explicit or 
implicit approval or endorsement or by conduct that is clearly encouraged or 
fits within a general policy, which would include inaction designed to 
encourage the crimes, for example.
113
 Finally, it should be noted that even 
the authorities that do not consider state or organizational policy as an 
element of crimes against humanity still regard it as evidentially relevant for 
establishing the other necessary elements, as mentioned above regarding the 
Kunarac case.  
3.4.2 War Crimes 
Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court shall have 
jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part 
of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.” 
Although this might seem like a requirement for a state or organizational 
policy, as is needed for crime against humanity, this is not an element of 
war crimes. Therefore, unlike crimes against humanity, even a single act can 
qualify as a war crime. This provision is actually an indicator to assist the 
ICC in determining where to focus its attention and resources, that is to not 
focus on isolated crimes but on the most serious situations which require 
action. Therefore, since this formulation is only guidance, the ICC can 
prosecute even isolated war crimes that have a sufficient gravity and/or 
impact.
114
 
3.4.3 Genocide 
As shown in section 3.3.3 above, the definition of genocide in the Genocide 
Convention does not include the requirement for a contextual element of a 
state or organizational policy, despite the fact that it is practically 
impossible for the crime of genocide to occur without a plan or organization 
by a state or state-like entity, or by some clique associated with it.
115
 Indeed, 
it is difficult to imagine “imposing measures” or “inflicting conditions of 
life” as isolated acts of an individual. Even though typically these acts 
would need a large number of individuals and a large scale to be carried out, 
the requirement of a state or organizational policy is excluded from the 
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definition.
116
 However, lately more attention has been directed to the role of 
state policy in international crimes.  
The first judgements of genocide and crimes against humanity in the ad hoc 
tribunals did not hold that a state plan or policy was an element of the crime 
of genocide and the subsequent practice of the ad hoc tribunals also 
confirmed that a state or organizational policy was not a requirement for 
finding that genocide occurred. In the Kayishema case, the ICTR explicitly 
stated that “[A]though a specific plan to destroy does not constitute an 
element of genocide, it would appear that it is not easy to carry out a 
genocide without a plan or organization”,117 but that “the existence of such 
plan would be strong evidence of the specific intent requirement for the 
crime of genocide.”118 
The above statement was also confirmed by the ICTY, which stated in the 
Jelisić case that “the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of 
the crime. However, in the context of proving specific intent, the existence of 
a plan or policy may become an important factor in most cases. The 
evidence may be consistent with the existence of a plan or policy, or may 
even show such existence, and the existence of a plan or policy may 
facilitate proof of the crime.”119 Therefore, similarly to crimes against 
humanity, the approach is that the policy element is not required, but that it 
is certainly useful and relevant for evidentiary reasons and for proving the 
dolus specialis of genocide. 
However, some scholars nonetheless advocate such a requirement. In fact, 
the approach and the analysis of customary international law of the ad hoc 
tribunals regarding this issue have been criticized as at best superficial and 
at worst simply incorrect.
120
 In fact, it is instead suggested that customary 
international law does, arguably, see state or organizational policy as a 
required element. It is argued that the contextual element of genocide found 
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in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC
121
 is nothing else than the state or 
organizational policy requirement and that the omission of the word 
“policy” is not crucial, as the differences in expressions are purely 
semantic.
122
 
Moreover, support for this position is found in the Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in 2005, mandated by the Security 
Council to investigate whether genocide occurred or not. The Commission 
concluded that the “government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of 
genocide.”123 (emphasis added). This conclusion gives rise to the argument 
that the Commission equalled specific intent for genocide with the existence 
of a state or organizational policy. 
A similar approach was taken by the International Court of Justice in the 
Bosnian Genocide case,
124
 which dealt with the state responsibility of Serbia 
for genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ICJ examined the specific 
intent of genocide through a state or organizational policy endorsed by 
Serbia and Montenegro. As William Schabas puts it, “[n]either the Darfur 
Commission nor the ICJ was looking for the specific intent of individual 
offenders. Rather, they were looking for the specific intent of a State, like 
Sudan, or a State-like entity, like the Bosnian Serbs. States, however, do not 
have specific intent. Individuals have specific intent. States have policy. [...] 
Obviously, when asked whether ‘acts of genocide have been committed,’ 
bodies like the Darfur Commission and the ICJ do not pursue their search 
for [...] marginal individuals. Rather, they look to the policy.”125 
Therefore, according to this approach, state or organizational policy would 
be a necessary requirement for finding that genocide was committed, and 
this approach stems from the assumption that “this massive crime is 
collective in nature and cannot occur unless the action of sole individuals is 
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masterminded, guided, directed, or supported by governmental authority or 
at any rate by a collective body or a multitude of organized persons.”126 
However, although these two approaches are perhaps the most common, 
Antonio Cassese has proposed a third approach to this issue, which involves 
approaching the individual acts of genocide differently. He claims that a 
contextual element is not required by customary international law for some 
acts of genocide, while it is for others: “[W]ith regard to two categories of 
genocide, namely:  
(i) killing members of a protected group; and  
(ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a protected 
group, one or more individuals may engage in the crime of genocide 
without any general policy or collective action being required for their 
being prosecuted and punished for that crime. [...] 
 I therefore submit that for these two categories of genocide international 
rules do not require the existence of either a widespread or systematic 
practice or a plan as a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide.”127  
Therefore, according to this approach, a state or organizational policy would 
not be necessary for defining the abovementioned categories as incidences 
of genocide. 
On the other hand, establishing other acts
128
 as incidences of genocide 
would require the existence of a state or organizational policy, as they 
presuppose or demand some kind of collective or organized action: 
“[A]ctions such as deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for the 
survival of members of a protected group [...], or [...] bringing about 
conditions of life leading to the destruction of the group, are necessarily 
carried out on a large scale and by a multitude of individuals in pursuance 
of a common plan [...]. Similarly, such measures to prevent births [...] are 
all activities that only state organs or other official authorities may 
undertake, or authorize to undertake, or at least approve or condone.”129 
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As we can see, there is still currently a debate regarding the role that state or 
organizational policy should play in crimes of genocide (as well as crimes 
against humanity). Furthermore, the debate demonstrates that the issue is far 
from settled. 
In the chapters below I will discuss individual gender based crimes against 
women. 
                                                                                                                            
UN Genocide Convention - a commentary” (Oxford University Press: 2009), page 128, at 
page 135 
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4. Rape 
4.1 Introduction 
In times of war, women have always been in danger of rape and sexual 
violence. This is evidenced by the many examples of sexual violence 
towards women during war even in recent history, from World Wars I and 
II, to the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, to the 
latest conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Sudan, etc.
130
 
However, even with vast examples of atrocities towards women, sexual 
crimes have long been overlooked and ignored as being not particularly 
serious. Although both men and women can be the victims of rape, data on 
rape indicates that it is essentially a crime committed against women.
131
 
For centuries, rape was seen as something to be expected in war and a right 
that belonged to the conqueror: an incentive for men to enlist into the 
military and a way to celebrate victory – a prize of war.132 Later, it was seen 
as a property crime (as a woman was often considered the property of her 
father or husband) or a crime against a family’s or husband’s honour, rather 
than against the victim of rape herself.
133
 
Generally, there are two theories as for the motives of rape: opportunity and 
policy. The theory of policy suggests that rape is perpetrated as a weapon of 
war, systematically terrorising and harming not only women but also whole 
communities. The theory of opportunity suggests that rape is committed by 
armed men who use the chaotic circumstances of armed conflict to indulge 
their libidos and desires. Support for this is found in the fact that UN 
peacekeeping troops and NGO personnel also commit rape.
134
 
International humanitarian law at the beginning of the 20
th
 century largely 
ignored rape and crimes of sexual violence and left them unpunished, 
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although certain documents have prohibited acts of wartime rape for 
hundreds of years.
135
 Rape as an individual crime was not included in the 
Charters of either the Nuremburg or Tokyo Tribunals after World War II. 
Although it could have been tried as “other inhumane acts” it was not 
prosecuted, despite the overwhelming evidence of rape and other crimes of 
sexual violence, such as in Japanese comfort camps. Rape was prosecuted in 
the Tokyo IMT as a war crime, however there were no convictions for 
crimes of rape only.
136
 Concerning World War II, the first instrument to 
expressly list rape as a crime against humanity was Control Council Law 
No. 10, however no crimes of rape were prosecuted under it.
137
 
After World War II, rape was mentioned in Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention,
138
 which states, inter alia, that “[w]omen shall be especially 
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, 
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.” However, a breach 
of this provision is not considered a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions and rape is not listed in Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.
139
 Moreover, Article 27 characterized sexual violence as an 
attack upon women’s honour rather than an attack upon her bodily and 
mental integrity and thus denies the great emotional and physical harm that 
victims of rape suffer.
140
 The two Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
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Conventions
141
 also expressly prohibited rape, but kept the same approach 
towards rape as the Geneva Conventions. 
However, while these instruments formally prohibited rape, in practice it 
was usually dismissed as an inevitable by-product of war and was rarely 
prosecuted.
142
 This continued until the 1990’s and the establishment of the 
ICTY, ICTR and afterwards the ICC. The atrocities towards women 
reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, such as mass rapes, 
existence of “rape camps”, forcible pregnancies, use of rape and sexual 
violence as weapons of war based on policy, prompted the international 
community to take more account of sexual crimes.  
For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was reported that “[..] rape was 
being used as an instrument of ethnic cleansing. Many documents were 
received by the Special Rapporteur in this connection. [...] Rape of women, 
including minors, has occurred on a large scale. [...] There is clear 
evidence that Croat, Muslim and Serb women have been detained for 
extended periods of time and repeatedly raped. [...] In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in Croatia, rape has been used as an instrument of ethnic 
cleansing.' [...] [R]ape has been used not only as an attack on the individual 
victim, but is intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the entire 
ethnic group. There are reliable reports of public rapes, for example, in 
front of a whole village, designed to terrorize the population and force 
ethnic groups to flee.”143  
Regarding the conflict in Rwanda, it was reported that “[...] rape was 
extremely widespread and that thousands of women were individually 
raped, gang-raped, raped with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun 
barrels, held in sexual slavery […] or sexually mutilated. [...] Rapes were 
sometimes followed by sexual mutilation, including mutilation of the vagina 
and pelvic area with machetes, knives, sticks, boiling water, and in one 
case, acid. [...] Young girls or those considered beautiful were particularly 
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at the mercy of the militia groups, who were a law unto themselves and 
often raped indiscriminately.”144 
Following such horrifying reports of sexual violence against women, it was 
clear that international criminal law needed to give more attention to 
prosecuting such crimes. Hence, as previously mentioned, the ICTY and 
ICTR became the first international criminal tribunals to expressly list rape 
as a crime against humanity and war crime
145
 and to prosecute those crimes. 
Based on the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR, the Rome Statute of the 
ICC included even more crimes of sexual violence. 
4.2 Definition of rape in international law 
National legislations generally do not have problems with clearly defining 
various punishable crimes, including rape. The national legislation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, defines rape as compelling another 
person to sexual intercourse by force or threat of immediate attack upon life 
or body, or life or body of someone close to that person.
146
 The definitions 
are similar in other national legislations as well. In Sweden, rape is forcing 
another person to have sexual intercourse or to engage in a comparable 
sexual act that, having regard to the nature of the violation and the 
circumstances in general, is comparable to enforced sexual intercourse, by 
violence or threat which involves or appears to the threatened person to 
involve an imminent danger.
147
 In Germany, rape is defined as coercing 
another person by force, threat of imminent danger or exploiting a situation 
in which the victim is unprotected and at the mercy of the offender to suffer 
sexual acts by the offender or a third person or engage in sexual acts with 
the offender or a third person.
148
 In France, rape is defined as any act of 
sexual penetration, whatever its nature, committed against another person by 
violence, constraint, threat or surprise.
149
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However, contrary to national law, defining rape in international criminal 
law is not nearly as clear and is, indeed, very problematic. In fact, one single 
definition does not exist, as no international legal instrument provides a 
statutory definition of rape. While the Statutes of the ICTY (Article 5(g)), of 
the ICTR (Article 3(g)) and of the ICC (7(1)(g)) all list rape as a crime 
against humanity; none of the statutes give a clear definition of rape. The 
closest provision of a definition can probably be found in the Elements of 
Crimes of the ICC. 
As there was no previous definition of rape in international treaty or 
customary law, the ICTY and ICTR judges were in a very delicate position 
of formulating a definition of rape by themselves, while taking into account 
both the interests of victims and the right of the accused to a fair trial. Their 
position was made even more difficult due to the fact that there were no 
previous prosecutions of rape before international criminal tribunals that 
they could use as precedent and draw inspiration from.
150
 This led to 
different definitions being adopted by the different tribunals. 
The first international criminal tribunal to define rape was the ICTR in the 
Akeyasu case.
151
 In its definition the Trial Chamber considered that rape is a 
form of aggression and focused on the conceptual framework of rape. It 
underlined that focusing on a mechanical description of the constituent acts 
of rape would be inadequate.
152
 Therefore, the Trial Chamber stated that 
“[...] rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, 
humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. 
[...] The Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual 
violence which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature 
which is committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive.”153  
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It also stated that “[s]exual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the 
human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even 
physical contact.” 154 
Therefore, in Akayesu the Trial Chamber attempted to emphasize that the 
violence was the main element of rape, rather than the acts of rape itself, 
like for example penetration. The Court held that sexual violence was not 
limited to physical invasion and could include acts which did not involve 
penetration. The definition given by the ICTR in the Akeyasu case was later 
followed by the ICTY in the Čelebići camp case,155 where the Trial 
Chamber stated that “[t]his Trial Chamber [...] sees no reason to depart 
from the conclusion of the ICTR in the Akayesu Judgement on this issue. 
Thus, the Trial Chamber considers rape to constitute a physical invasion of 
a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances that are 
coercive.” 
The definition of rape established by Akayesu was considered to be 
groundbreaking. Firstly, because it was the first time the term “invasion” 
was used, which recognized that rape was a wider sexual assault on the 
bodily integrity of the victim, and more than just penile/vaginal penetration. 
Secondly, because it characterized rape as a sexual act occurring in coercive 
circumstances, which pleased feminist and rape victims advocates, who 
were concerned about the pressure placed on victims in order to establish 
consent in rape trials, which traditionally required the showing of force and 
resistance for successful prosecution.
156
 The issue of consent will be further 
discussed below. 
However, in spite of initially following the definition established in 
Akeyasu, the ICTY subsequently adopted a different view to the definition 
of rape. The next important case before the ICTY, which departed from the 
previous definition, was the Furundžija case.157 In Furundžija the Trial 
Chamber mentioned the previous definition accepted by the ICTR in 
Akeyasu and the ICTY itself in the Čelebići camp158 case. However, it then 
proceeded to disregard it, presumably as it believed that the definition 
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lacked the specificity necessary in criminal law.
159
 The Trial Chamber stated 
that there was no definition of rape in international law and instead provided 
their own definition, which was very much focused on the physical acts and 
physical elements of rape.
 160
  
It conducted an extensive overview of rape laws in the major legal systems 
of the world, trying to find common elements upon which it could base its 
definition. After finishing such an analysis, it stated that “[...] the Trial 
Chamber finds that the following may be accepted as the objective elements 
of rape: 
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator 
or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person. 
As pointed out above, international criminal rules punish not only rape but 
also any serious sexual assault falling short of actual penetration.”161 
From the above comparison of the two definitions, it is clear that the 
difference between the Akeyasu and Furundžija definitions is significant. 
While the first does not consider the physical acts of rape as crucial, the 
second focuses almost exclusively on them.  
A third approach was later again articulated by the ICTY in the Kunarac 
case,
 162
 which further developed the Furundžija definition. The Kunarac 
definition kept the description of sexual acts and reference to body parts 
from Furundžija. However, it altered the second element, changing it from 
force or coercion to no consent to the act. In Kunarac, The Trial Chamber 
focused on sexual acts involving sexual penetration to which the victim did 
not consent or could not resist
163
 and stated that: “[T]he Trial Chamber 
understands that the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is 
constituted by: the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or 
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anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by 
the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of 
the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a 
result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual 
penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the 
victim.”164 
Within the ICTY and the ICTR it would seem that the Kunarac definition 
has been used more often than the previous two approaches. A similar 
approach, based on non-consent, was also accepted by the SCSL.
165
 
However, the jurisprudence of these courts, from Akayesu and Čelebići 
camp
166
 to Muhimana
167
 through Furundžija and Kunarac reveals a great 
lack of unanimity among judges regarding the definition and analysis of 
rape in international criminal law.
168
 This was evident even in the ICTR 
itself, where the Trial Chamber in Musema
169
 and Niyitegeka
170
 followed the 
Akayesu definition of rape, while, on the other hand, the Trial Chambers in 
Semanza,
171
 Kajelijeli
172
 and Kamuhanda
173
 preferred the ICTY definition 
of rape from Furundžija and then Kunarac.  
The Gacumbitsi
174
 Trial Chamber in the ICTR was the first one that 
attempted to reconcile these different definitions. The Trial Chamber in 
Muhimana also suggested that the Furundžija and Kunarac definitions do 
not necessarily depart from the Akayesu one. It stated that “[t]his Chamber 
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considers that Furundžija and Kunarac, which sometimes have been 
construed as departing from the Akayesu definition of rape – as was done in 
Semanza - actually are substantially aligned to this definition and provide 
additional details on the constituent elements of acts considered to be rape. 
[...] The Chamber takes the view that the Akayesu definition and the 
Kunarac elements are not incompatible or substantially different in their 
application. Whereas Akayesu referred broadly to a ‘physical invasion of a 
sexual nature’, Kunarac went on to articulate the parameters of what would 
constitute a physical invasion of a sexual nature amounting to rape. [...] On 
the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Chamber endorses the conceptual 
definition of rape established in Akayesu, which encompasses the elements 
set out in Kunarac.”175 Therefore, the Muhimana Trial Chamber submitted 
that Furundžija and Kunarac tacitly accepted the Akayesu definition of rape.  
This suggestion is debatable, but it is true that, as the Akayesu definition is 
broader, the ICTY Furundžija and Kunarac definitions fit within the 
Akayesu definition and every act of rape under the Furundžija/Kunarac 
definitions would also constitute rape under the Akayesu definition. 
However, the same does not apply vice versa, that is not every rape under 
the Akayesu definition would be considered as rape under the 
Furundžija/Kunarac definitions.176 
4.2.1 Elements of rape before the ICC 
The fourth approach and definition was adopted in the Rome Statute of the 
ICC and combines elements from the Akayesu and Furundžija definitions. 
The ICC approach is also broader than the Furundžija definition and avoids 
the non-consent element present in the Kunarac definition of rape.
177
 The 
Rome Statute lists rape as both a crime against humanity, in Article 7(1)(g) 
and as a war crime, in Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi). The ICC 
Elements of Crimes further elaborate and list the following common 
elements of rape as a crime against humanity and a war crime: 
1.  The perpetrator invaded* the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of 
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of 
the victim with any object or any other part of the body. 
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2.  The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, 
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, 
or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was 
committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.** 
(contextual elements omitted) 
The above elements also contain two footnotes, which read: 
“* The concept of ‘invasion’ is intended to be broad enough to be gender-
neutral. 
** It is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine 
consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity. [...]” 
The ICC Elements of Crimes adopt a part of the Akeyasu definition by 
emphasizing coercive circumstances, but also a part of the more mechanical 
and narrower Furundžija definition, which describes and focuses on the 
physical acts of rape.
178
 The Elements of Crimes do not, however, 
completely focus on the issue of non-consent but rather on force, threat of 
force, coercion or a coercive environment. This is a mixture of the Akayesu 
and Furundžija definitions, (as the Kunarac definition was not available 
when the Rome Statute was adopted),
179
 but it is closer to Furundžija than 
Akayesu.
180
 
4.3 Rape and (non)consent 
The above-mentioned judgments in Akayesu and Kunarac have greatly 
contributed to the proper recognition of rape in international criminal law, 
especially the Judgment in Akayesu which could be considered as 
revolutionary at the time. However, these two cases also illustrated a 
division in international law between a consent-based definition of rape 
(Kunarac) and a broader coercive circumstances approach to rape 
(Akayesu).
181
 Whereas Akayesu does not require non-consent by the victim 
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to be shown, Kunarac does. It establishes non-consent as an integral 
element of the crime of rape, which must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt by the prosecutor.  
The traditional definition of rape presumes that the victim consented to the 
sexual act if there was no clear evidence to the contrary, such as physical 
resistance by the victim. Such a definition of rape worked to the advantage 
of the perpetrator, as it focused on the conduct of the victim (that is, whether 
she physically opposed the act or not).
182
 Rape laws were generally based on 
a demonstration of force from the accused and of resistance from the 
victim.
183
 Traditionally, it was considered that “in effect, the law permits 
men to assume that a woman is always willing to have sex, even with a 
stranger, even with substantial physical force, unless the evidence shows 
unambiguously she was unwilling.”184 
The concept of consent is based on the notion that the individual is the 
ultimate decision maker of his/her fate: “[It] acts as a moral basis for 
results, procedures and transactions and is the ultimate expression of self 
determination.”185 It is supposed to protect a person’s ability to make 
choices about his/her body and sexual activities and to “[have] control over 
who touches one’s body, and how, [which] lies at the core of human dignity 
and autonomy.”186 The concept of consent also serves to protect the accused 
from rape charges when the other party had actually consented. 
However, although the consent-based concept of rape was at first seen as a 
means to adequately recognize individuals’ right to bodily integrity, it has 
also been criticized for placing too much attention on the behaviour and 
conduct of the victim. This can be very traumatizing for the victims, where 
they sometimes repeatedly have to assert they did not consent and the 
different circumstances (such as threat, duress of the victim or power 
relations) are often not taken into account. This can, and often does, 
dissuade victims from reporting rape, and it has been argued that the focus 
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should shift from a consent approach to a coercive circumstances-based 
approach, which is seen as a distinct model of understanding rape.
187
  
It has also been argued that the difference between these approaches is how 
rape is seen conceptually: as a crime of power and aggression or a sexual 
crime. “Where coercion definitions of rape see power-domination and 
violence - non-consent definitions envision love or passion gone wrong. 
Consent definitions accordingly have proof of rape turn on victim and 
perpetrator mental state: who wanted what, who knew what when. This 
crime basically occurs in individual psychic space. Coercion definitions by 
distinction turn on proof of physical acts, surrounding context, or 
exploitation of relative position: who did what to whom and sometimes 
why.”188 
As stated above, the approach taken by the ICTR in Akayesu was praised by 
feminist groups and victims’ advocates for taking the focus away from the 
issue of consent and focusing on the coercive circumstances prevailing at 
the time of the rape. Kunarac, on the other hand, was then heavily criticized 
for re-focusing on consent and making it an integral element of rape. The 
concept and legal doctrine of consent is founded on the presumption that 
individuals can make rational and informed choices regarding their best 
interests and that they must be able to do so in a neutral environment. 
External factors, such as coercion, violence, or threats can place the victim 
in a state of fear or submission, thereby limiting their autonomy and 
negating their ability to freely and genuinely give consent. Therefore, in 
such situations it is often not relevant to establish consent when coercive 
circumstances exist.
189
 
While this is also applicable to national rape legislation, the issue of 
coercive circumstances, which negates the ability to give real consent, is 
even more important when prosecuting rape under international criminal 
law. It is argued that in international law, in contrast to national legislation, 
non-consent should not be considered as an element of sexual violence 
crimes, but only as an affirmative defence of the accused. As argued by the 
prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR, as well as legal scholars, crimes which 
are under the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals (either the 
ICC or the ad hoc ones), such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
                                                 
187
  Grewal, Kiran: “The Protection of Sexual Autonomy under International Criminal Law: 
The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Defining Rape” in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Volume 10, Issue 2 (2012), page 373, at page 385 
188
  MacKinnon, Catharine A: “Defining rape internationally: A comment on Akayesu” in 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Volume 44, Issue 3 (2006), page 940, at page 941 
189
  Boon, Kristen: “Rape and forced pregnancy under the ICC Statute: Human dignity, 
autonomy and consent” in Columbia Human Rights Law Review Volume 32, Issue 3 
(2001), page 625, at page 654 
 48 
crimes, are the most serious crimes that are of importance to the whole 
international community and prohibition of these crimes protects 
supranational values. Therefore, any act falling within these categories is 
difficult to interpret as being dependent on the person’s consent or lack 
thereof.
190
  
When sexual crimes, especially rape, occur in the context of genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes, it is argued that genuine consent is 
impossible under such circumstances. For example, regarding genocide, 
“the very nature of the circumstances in which rape occurs in the context of 
genocide is predicated in the special intent to destroy a group in whole or in 
part, the victim of the rape being part of the group targeted for such 
destruction. This is a major flaw of Kunarac, given its heavy reliance on 
domestic law.” 191 Therefore, it is argued there can be no genuine consent by 
the victim to the act of rape under international criminal law: “A widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population generates highly coercive 
circumstances. The perpetrator's conduct itself need be neither widespread 
or systematic, nor intended to inflict injury upon the civilian population. He 
is guilty of a crime against humanity only if his act is-both objectively and 
subjectively-sufficiently linked to the collective attack. Any sexual act that is 
so related to the overall context will therefore occur under coercive 
circumstances that rule out the possibility of genuine consent.”192  
Therefore, it is argued that “any sexual contact that fulfils the requirements 
of the international element will therefore occur under circumstances that 
make genuine consent by the victim impossible. For these reasons, consent 
cannot be considered the nub of crimes of sexual violence within the 
framework of international criminal law.”193 Moreover, the Prosecutors of 
the ICTY and ICTR claimed that rape should be viewed in the same way as 
other violations of international law, where the Prosecution does not have to 
prove non-consent.
194
  
Therefore, many scholars are of the opinion that consent should not be an 
element of the crime of rape and that when the common contextual elements 
of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes are established, the 
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issue of consent quickly becomes irrelevant and inappropriate. Moreover, 
such questions can be very traumatizing and insulting for rape victims, no 
matter how they are formulated (“did you agree”, “did you consent”, “did 
you fight back”, “was it against your will”), and especially if the victim had 
established the existence of coercive circumstances. An example is a 
witness in Kunarac, who, after explaining that she had been raped 150 times 
in 40 days, answered the question of whether the sexual acts had been 
against her will by saying: “Please, madam, if over a period of 40 days you 
have sex with someone, with several individuals, do you really think that is 
with your own will.”195  
Therefore, according to these arguments, once it is established that a crime 
was committed in the context of an international crime (genocide, crime 
against humanity or war crime), the question of consent should become 
irrelevant and should not have to be further established by the prosecutor. In 
the rare cases where consent might have actually existed, it should be raised 
as a defence by the accused, to be first tested in camera, but not as an 
element for the prosecutor to prove.
196
 On the other hand, others argue that 
presuming coercion would make consensual sexual relations legally 
impossible in certain circumstances,
197
 and that assumptions regarding 
consent could lead to convictions of persons who could prove that the other 
party had consented.
198
 
However, despite such arguments, in the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
consent has firmly remained an element of the crime of rape and the 
Kunarac definition has been favoured. Moreover, after the Kunarac 
Judgment, the question of consent was revisited by the ICTR in the 
Gacumbitsi appeal. Although the issue was not directly necessary for the 
appeal, the Prosecution requested the Appeal Chamber to decide the issue as 
a matter of general importance for international criminal law. In its 
Judgment, the Gacumbitsi Appeal Chamber stated that “[…] Kunarac 
establishes that non-consent and knowledge thereof are elements of rape as 
a crime against humanity. The import of this is that the prosecution bears 
the burden of proving these elements beyond reasonable doubt. If the 
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affirmative defence approach were taken, the accused would bear, at least, 
the burden of production, that is, the burden to introduce evidence 
providing prima facie support for the defence. […] As the Prosecution 
points out, Rule 96 of the Rules does refer to consent as a ‘defence’. The 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not, however, redefine the elements of 
the crimes over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, which are defined by 
the Statute and by international law. […] The Appeals Chamber agrees, 
moreover, with the analysis of the Trial Chamber in the Kunarac case. […] 
Rather than changing the definition of the crime by turning an element into 
a defence, Rule 96 of the Rules must be read simply to define the 
circumstances under which evidence of consent will be admissible.”199 
Therefore, the Gacumbitsi Appeals Chamber again confirmed that non-
consent is an integral element of the crime of rape that must be established 
by the Prosecutor and not just a defence to be put forward and established 
by the accused. However, in both Kunarac and in Gacumbitsi, the 
Chambers also stated that not every case requires that consent be established 
through the victims’ words or acts or lack thereof. In the Kunarac case, for 
example, regarding the analysis of national legislation when an act will 
constitute rape, the Trial Chamber stated that “[t]hese factors for the most 
part can be considered as falling within three broad categories:  
(i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or threat of force to the 
victim or a third party;  
(ii) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or a variety of other 
specified circumstances which made the victim particularly vulnerable 
or negated her ability to make an informed refusal; or  
(iii) the sexual activity occurs without the consent of the victim.”200 
The Trial Chamber also stated that “[t]he basic principle which is truly 
common to these legal systems is that serious violations of sexual autonomy 
are to be penalised. Sexual autonomy is violated wherever the person 
subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a 
voluntary participant.”201 
This was the first time in international criminal law that a Court used the 
term “sexual autonomy”. Furthermore, although it used a consent-based 
definition of rape the Kunarac Trial Chamber adopted a much wider 
concept of consent than in Furundžija, which was criticized as being unduly 
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narrow.
202
 It stated that “[c]onsent for this purpose must be consent given 
voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the 
surrounding circumstances.”203 This definition has been praised by some for 
“avoiding the traditional limitations of consent-based rape definitions, 
which have focused too heavily on the victim’s conduct and the extent of her 
or his active resistance. Instead, by using the language of ‘voluntariness’, to 
be assessed in relation to the surrounding circumstances, and ‘sexual 
autonomy’, the Trial Chamber seemed to be explicitly recognizing the 
importance of taking into account coercive circumstances that may impact 
on an individual’s ability to make free and informed decisions.”204 
The Appeals Chamber in Kunarac agreed with the Trial Chamber, and 
further stated that “[…] the Appellants in this case were convicted of raping 
women held in de facto military headquarters, detention centres and 
apartments maintained as soldiers’ residences. As the most egregious 
aspect of the conditions, the victims were considered the legitimate sexual 
prey of their captors. Typically, the women were raped by more than one 
perpetrator and with a regularity that is nearly inconceivable. […] Such 
detentions amount to circumstances that were so coercive as to negate any 
possibility of consent. […] In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber agrees with 
the Trial Chamber’s determination that the coercive circumstances present 
in this case made consent to the instant sexual acts by the Appellants 
impossible.”205 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber stated that the 
circumstances the victims were under were such that any kind of genuine 
consent was impossible, thus meaning that the prosecutor did not have to 
establish non-consent by referring to the words or acts (or lack thereof) of 
the victims. 
Therefore, even though the Kunarac definition of rape requires non-consent 
of the victim as an element, the fact that it is based on sexual autonomy 
implies that only genuine, voluntary and free consent will be accepted. This 
means that a narrow understanding of consent will generally be insufficient, 
and that surrounding circumstances will also have to be assessed and taken 
into account. Examples of such circumstances include the victim’s mental 
capacity, awareness of available options, whether she was provided with 
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adequate information or whether she could exercise freedom of choice free 
from external interference.
206
 Therefore, consent should be affirmative, 
rather than negative (that is, the victims should freely and voluntarily say 
yes instead of just not saying no). The Kunarac Appeal Chamber stated that 
“[f]orce or threat of force provides clear evidence of non-consent, but force 
is not an element per se of rape. In particular, the Trial Chamber wished to 
explain that there are ‘factors [other than force] which would render an act 
of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the 
victim’. A narrow focus on force or threat of force could permit perpetrators 
to evade liability for sexual activity to which the other party had not 
consented by taking advantage of coercive circumstances without relying on 
physical force. [...] [I]t is worth observing that the circumstances giving 
rise to the instant appeal and that prevail in most cases charged as either 
war crimes or crimes against humanity will be almost universally coercive. 
That is to say, true consent will not be possible.”207 Moreover, even the 
Rules of Procedure of the ICTY preclude the use of consent as a defence of 
the accused in certain cases, such as when the victim was, inter alia, in 
detention or captivity.
208
 
Furthermore, in Muhimana, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR, following the 
Kunarac Appeals Chamber, also confirmed that consent does not always 
have to be proven, but that coercion can be used as evidence of non-consent 
and that in most situations which give rise to prosecution under international 
criminal law genuine consent will be impossible: “In analyzing the 
relationship between consent and coercion, the Appeals Chamber 
acknowledged that coercion provides clear evidence of non-consent. [...] 
Similarly, the Chamber also recalls that the Furundžija Trial Chamber 
acknowledged that ‘any form of captivity vitiates consent’. […] Accordingly, 
the Chamber is persuaded by the Appellate Chamber’s analysis that 
coercion is an element that may obviate the relevance of consent as an 
evidentiary factor in the crime of rape. Further, this Chamber concurs with 
the opinion that circumstances prevailing in most cases charged under 
international criminal law, as either genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
war crimes, will be almost universally coercive, thus vitiating true 
consent.”209  
                                                 
206
  Grewal, Kiran: “The Protection of Sexual Autonomy under International Criminal Law: 
The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Defining Rape” in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Volume 10, Issue 2 (2012), page 373, at page 386 
207
  ICTY, case IT-96-23 & 23/1 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Foča), Appeal Chamber 
Judgment of 12 June 2002, paras 129-130  
208
  ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 96, which states:  
209
  ICTR, case ICTR-95-1B Prosecutor v Muhimana, Trial Chamber Judgment of 28 April 
2005, paras 544-546 
 53 
Finally, the Appeals Chamber in Gacumbitsi perhaps most clearly explained 
how consent may be established. It stated that “[t]he Prosecution can prove 
non-consent beyond reasonable doubt by proving the existence of coercive 
circumstances under which meaningful consent is not possible. […] [T]he 
Trial Chamber will consider all of the relevant and admissible evidence in 
determining whether […] it is appropriate to conclude that non-consent is 
proven beyond reasonable doubt. But it is not necessary, as a legal matter, 
for the Prosecution to introduce evidence concerning the words or conduct 
of the victim or the victim’s relationship to the perpetrator. Nor need it 
introduce evidence of force. Rather, the Trial Chamber is free to infer non-
consent from the background circumstances, such as an ongoing genocide 
campaign or the detention of the victim. Indeed, the Trial Chamber did so in 
this case.”210  
Therefore, it is clear that it is not necessary to induce specific evidence from 
the victim that she did not consent. Although non-consent has been retained 
as an element of the crime of rape, the Tribunals have adopted a common 
sense approach to proving non-consent. This minimizes focus on the 
victim’s conduct and the requirement of proving non-consent will generally 
not be difficult to discharge.
211
  
Having in mind the width of the concept of coercion in the Kunarac 
definition of rape (and that consent of each individual victim does not have 
to be established), it has been argued that “it becomes clear that the 
apparent division between consent-based definitions of rape, on the one 
hand, and coercive circumstances approaches, on the other hand, is a 
largely artificial distinction. Whether an individual’s sexual autonomy was 
violated requires attention to be paid to the wishes of the individual in 
question (something which will frequently be ascertained from whether she 
or he consented or not). This is important as ‘viewing women as 
autonomous human beings would mean treating them as persons who know 
what they want and mean what they say’.”212 
Regarding the ICC, it must be stated that it is not completely clear how it 
will treat the issue of consent, as the Court has not had to consider the issue 
yet. Furthermore, as stated above, the Elements of Crimes of the ICC 
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doesn’t explicitly list non-consent as an element of the rape. Moreover, 
although the ICC is not bound by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, 
it is unlikely to completely ignore them either, as they reflect wider trends in 
international law and international human rights law.
213
 It has been argued 
that the ICC should not follow the Kunarac definition of rape and that the 
Akayesu and ICC Elements of Crimes definitions best fit the reality of rape 
and that these definitions should be taken as the leading ones in 
international criminal law.
214
 
The second element of rape in the ICC Elements of Crimes as well as Rule 
70 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence are structured to require a 
two-part analysis in determining whether evidence of the victim’s consent 
will be admissible as an affirmative defence to rape. Firstly, it must be 
established whether the victim actually had legal capacity to give consent 
(regarding which Rule 70 precludes inferring of consent when the victim is 
unable to give genuine consent, for example for induced, natural or old age 
reasons).
215
 Secondly, if the first part of the analysis is met and the victim 
was legally capable of giving her consent, the next issue that will be 
considered is whether there were any coercive circumstances which 
undermined the victim’s ability to exercise her free choice. If force, threats 
of force or coercion existed and affected the victim’s ability to give consent, 
Rule 70 establishes that the victim's acts or words cannot be used to infer 
she gave consent and there will be a presumption against consent. Rule 70 
also creates a standard of affirmative consent, as consent cannot be inferred 
from the victim’s lack of resistance or silence.216 The second element of 
rape creates a presumption of non-consent in coercive situations, but it does 
not completely exclude consent, as consent will still be relevant if the 
defendant argues that the circumstances were not coercive or if the 
Prosecutor cannot establish force or other types of coercion. 
Finally, it should be noted that it is also argued that the ICC provisions on 
rape are disjointed, lack clarity and that they are not consistent with the 
dominant approaches taken in international criminal law jurisprudence, 
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international human rights law and many national legal systems.
217
 
Therefore, the ICC should use its first cases to expressly articulate and 
endorse the concept of sexual autonomy as being central to the prohibition 
of rape and sexual violence in international criminal law, and as a concept 
which already underlies ICC instruments. Moreover, the issue of consent 
should be clarified as being a defence to rape, rather than an element of rape 
and as requiring genuine and meaningful affirmative consent.
218
 
4.4 Rape as other crimes 
As stated above, the statutes of international criminal courts and tribunals 
have recognized rape as an offence of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. However, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals has recognized 
that rape can also amount to other crimes if the requisite elements of those 
crimes are fulfilled. Therefore, rape can arise in connection with genocide, 
torture, persecution, inhumane treatment, wilful causation of great suffering, 
serious injury to body or health, or be a component of murder or wilful 
killing.
219
 The recognition of this is “a commendable approach that involves 
a re-interpretation of general international criminal law norms to more 
accurately reflect the experiences of women.”220 However, due to space 
constraints, only rape as genocide and torture will be discussed below. 
4.4.1 Rape as genocide 
The list of acts which constitute genocide in the Genocide Convention, 
mentioned above, are exhaustive. This signifies that acts which are not 
included in the list do not constitute genocide, even if the perpetrator acted 
with the intent to destroy a protected group.
221
 At first sight, it might seem 
that rape does not fit within this definition,
222
 but in fact it has been 
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recognized in jurisprudence that rape can constitute genocide under the act 
of “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”. To fall 
under this category, the mental or bodily harm must be serious. “Serious” 
mental harm means that it must be more than a minor or temporary 
impairment of mental faculties.
223
  
For example, the Trial Chamber in Krstić stated that “serious harm need not 
cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes 
beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be 
harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s 
ability to lead a normal and constructive life. In subscribing to the above 
case-law, the Chamber holds that inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual 
abuse and deportation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily 
or mental injury.”224 Therefore, the definition of genocide through causing 
serious bodily or mental harm specifically includes sexual violence which 
causes such harm.
225
 
Men and women can be targeted in different ways during genocide and acts 
directed at women, such as sexual violence, can be used as an integral 
component of genocidal strategy. Understanding how crimes of sexual 
violence can constitute genocide has been a great challenge in 
reconceptualising international crimes from a gender perspective. However, 
if the requisite genocidal intent can be established, there is no reason why 
sexual violence should not be considered as part of the actus reus of 
genocide.
226
 
In spite of the fact that its initial indictment did not include a charge of rape, 
the Akayesu case before the ICTR was the first case considered by 
international criminal courts that expressly listed rape as genocide. It was 
only after hearing testimonies of multiple rapes, that the Tribunal allowed 
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the Prosecutor to amend the indictment and include in it rape as genocide.
227
 
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber first interpreted the Genocide Convention as 
including a prohibition against torture and then found that rape can be a 
form of torture, thus linking rape to genocide.
228
 
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber stated: “With regard, particularly, to [...] 
rape and sexual violence, […] they constitute genocide in the same way as 
any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, 
rape and sexual violence certainly constitute […] one of the worst ways of 
inflict[ing] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental 
harm. [...] These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of 
Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an 
integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi 
women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the 
destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole. [...] Sexual violence was a step in 
the process of destruction of the Tutsi group - destruction of the spirit, of the 
will to live, and of life itself. [...][T]he Chamber finds firstly that the acts 
described [...] constitute the factual elements of the crime of genocide, 
namely the killings of Tutsi or the serious bodily and mental harm inflicted 
on the Tutsi.”229  
The position that rape can constitute genocide stated by the ICTR in 
Akeyasu has been confirmed in several subsequent cases before the ICTR, 
such as Muhimana,
230
 Musema
231
 and Gacumbitsi.
232
 As for the ICTY, there 
have, so far, been no convictions for rape as genocide. However, the ICTY 
jurisprudence recognizes the possibility that sexual violence crimes can 
constitute genocide.
233
 In Furundžija, although the issue of rape as genocide 
was not directly relevant to the case, the Trial Chamber stated in passing 
that “[r]ape may also amount to a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, 
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a violation of the laws or customs of war or an act of genocide, if the 
requisite elements are met, and may be prosecuted accordingly.”234 The 
reason why rape can constitute genocide and why it is an “effective” method 
of genocide is because in patriarchal societies it renders female victims of 
rape socially infertile, unmarriageable or untouchable, as they are often 
isolated from society and seen as “damaged goods.” 235 
Regarding the ICC, there have, so far, been no convictions of rape or 
genocide (or rape as genocide) before the Court. However, in the Al Bashir 
case it is evident that the ICC accepted the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
Tribunals regarding rape as genocide. In the Second Decision on the 
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, the ICC Pre Trial 
Chamber stated that “According to the Elements of Crimes the specific 
material element of this count of genocide [causing serious bodily and 
mental harm] is that the perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm 
to one or more persons, which may include acts of torture, rape, sexual 
violence or inhuman or degrading treatment. The Prosecution listed the 
following acts within the present count of genocide:  
(i) acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence;  
(ii) torture; and  
(iii) forcible displacement of members of the targeted groups. 
[…] The Chamber is […] satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that acts of rape, torture and forcible displacement were committed 
against members of the targeted ethnic groups. Accordingly, the Chamber 
finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the material element 
of the crime of genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, as 
provided for in article 6(b) of the Statute, is fulfilled.”236 Therefore, it is 
clear that the ICC also accepted the ad hoc Tribunals’ findings that rape can 
constitute genocide if the requisite intent exists. 
It has been argued that it is extremely important to acknowledge and 
recognize that rape can constitute genocide, as the legal qualification of rape 
as genocide is essential to actuate state intervention in situations of massive 
and systematic rapes. It has been argued that, although states are not 
required to intervene in cases of crimes against humanity, customary 
international law imposes a duty of states to intervene when genocide occurs 
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and that classifying rape as genocide could function as a deterrent in times 
of armed conflict.
237
  
An explicit inclusion of sexual violence crimes as acts that can constitute 
genocide would also make these provisions consistent with provisions in 
international criminal law on war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Therefore, it has been argued that certain sexual violence crimes should 
explicitly be incorporated into the genocide definition.
238
 Moreover, it has 
also been argued that the Genocide Convention itself, and its list of 
protected groups, should be amended so that gender becomes one of the 
Convention’s protected groups. Such a provision would cover the genocide 
of women through their gender classification (that is because they are 
women) and should not be confused with genocide against women which is 
aimed at destroying one of the already protected groups, such as national or 
ethnic groups.
239
 However, while this might influence the further 
advancement of gender-based crimes in international criminal law, it also 
perhaps risks expanding and diluting the definition of genocide beyond what 
was intended. Furthermore, perhaps it does not seem likely that genocide 
could realistically be attempted against women as a gender. A delicate 
balance would need to be struck if gender were introduced as a protected 
group in regards to genocide. 
4.4.2 Torture 
Throughout history, sexual violence has often been used as a means of 
torturing women, as the act of rape inflicts severe physical and mental pain 
and is often aggravated by additional factors, such as social and cultural 
implications, risk of sexually transmitted diseases, risk of pregnancy, 
damage of the reproductive system, etc.
240
 As stated above, rape can also 
constitute torture and the crime of torture was used as a link between rape 
and genocide. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber stated that “[l]ike torture, rape 
is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, 
discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, 
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rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture 
when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”241 
Afterwards, in Kunarac, the Trial Chamber altered this definition of torture 
and stated that torture in international humanitarian law does not necessarily 
require presence of a state or official or other person of authority. The 
Chamber stated that “[...] the definition of torture under international 
humanitarian law does not comprise the same elements […] under human 
rights law. [...] [T]he presence of a state official or of any other authority-
wielding person in the torture process is not necessary for the offence to be 
regarded as torture under international humanitarian law. [...] [I]n the field 
of international humanitarian law, the elements of the offence of torture 
[…] are as follows:  
(i) The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental.  
(ii) The act or omission must be intentional.  
(iii) The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession, 
or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, 
or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third 
person.”242  
This position was also supported by the Appeals Chamber
243
 and by the 
Trial Chamber in Kvočka.244 That rape can constitute torture has been 
recognized in a number of cases before the ICTY. For example, in 
Furundžija the Trial Chamber stated that “[i]nternational case law [...] 
evince[s] a momentum towards addressing […] the use of rape in the 
course of detention and interrogation as a means of torture and, therefore, 
as a violation of international law. Rape is resorted to either by the 
interrogator himself or by other persons associated with the interrogation of 
a detainee, as a means of punishing, intimidating, coercing or humiliating 
the victim, or obtaining information, or a confession, from the victim or a 
third person.”245  
                                                 
241
  ICTR, case ICTR-96-4 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment of 02 September 
1998, para 597 
242
  ICTY, case IT-96-23 & 23/1 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Foča), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 22 February 2001, paras 496-497 
243
  ICTY, case IT-96-23 & 23/1 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Foča), Appeal Chamber 
Judgment of 12 June 2002, para 148 
244
  ICTY, case IT-98-30/1 Prosecutor v Kvočka et al. (Omarska, Keraterm & Trnopolje 
Camps), Trial Chamber Judgment of 02 November 2001, para 139 
245
  ICTY, case IT-95-17/1 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Lašva Valley), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 10 December 1998, para 163 
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The Kunarac Appeal Chamber also stated that “[g]enerally speaking, some 
acts establish per se the suffering of those upon whom they were inflicted. 
Rape is obviously such an act. [...] Sexual violence necessarily gives rise to 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, and in this way 
justifies its characterisation as an act of torture. [...] Severe pain or 
suffering, as required by the definition of the crime of torture, can thus be 
said to be established once rape has been proved, since the act of rape 
necessarily implies such pain or suffering.”246 The ICTY has clearly stated, 
in a number of other cases, that rape and sexual violence can reach the level 
of torture.
247
  
The issue of rape as torture was perhaps most explored in the Mucić et al 
case. The Trial Chamber examined the definition of rape, accepting the one 
given previously by Akayesu, and analysed the jurisprudence of other 
international bodies that dealt with the crime of rape as torture, such as the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights, and then made its findings. The Trial Chamber stated that 
“[r]ape causes severe pain and suffering, both physical and psychological. 
The psychological suffering […] may be exacerbated by social and cultural 
conditions and can be particularly acute and long lasting. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to envisage circumstances in which rape, by, or at the instigation of 
a public official, or with the consent or acquiescence of an official, could be 
considered as occurring for a purpose that does not, in some way, involve 
punishment, coercion, discrimination or intimidation. [...] Accordingly, 
whenever rape and other forms of sexual violence meet the aforementioned 
criteria, then they shall constitute torture, in the same manner as any other 
acts that meet this criteria.”248 
The above statements mostly focus on the element of physical or mental 
suffering, and it has been established undoubtedly that rape can produce the 
level of suffering necessary for torture. Moreover, as stated by the Trial 
Chambers in the cases mentioned above, in order for an act to be considered 
as torture it must have a purpose. For example, in most instances the 
purpose is to obtain information from the victim or a third person. However, 
the purpose of torture can also be to obtain a confession from the victim or a 
third person, to punish the victim for an act he/she or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, to intimidate or coerce the 
victim or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
                                                 
246
  ICTY, case IT-96-23 & 23/1 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Foča), Appeal Chamber 
Judgment of 12 June 2002, para 151 
247
  ICTY, case IT-98-30/1 Prosecutor v Kvočka et al. (Omarska, Keraterm & Trnopolje 
Camps), Trial Chamber Judgment of 02 November 2001, paras 144-145  
248
  For example ICTY, case IT-96-21 Prosecutor v Mucić et al. (Čelebići Camp), Trial 
Chamber Judgment of 16 November 1998, paras 495-496 
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kind.
249
 Therefore, only a rape with such a purpose will constitute the crime 
of torture, instead of the crime of rape. 
The approach taken by the ICTY was also confirmed by the ICTR, in the 
Semanza case. The accused, Laurent Semanza, the former bourgmestre of 
The Bicumbi commune, was convicted for instigating a crowd to rape Tutsi 
women before killing them. The Trial Chamber stated that “[t]he Chamber 
has found [...] that the Accused, in the presence of commune and military 
authorities, encouraged a crowd to rape Tutsi women before killing them. 
[...] Noting, in particular, the extreme level of fear occasioned by the 
circumstances surrounding the event and the nature of the rape of Victim A, 
the Chamber finds that the perpetrator inflicted severe mental suffering 
sufficient to form the material element of torture. It is therefore unnecessary 
to determine whether this rape also inflicted severe physical pain or 
suffering [...]. [...] The Chamber finds that the rape was committed on the 
basis of discrimination, targeting Victim A because she was a Tutsi woman. 
The Chamber recalls that severe suffering inflicted for the purposes of 
discrimination constitutes torture and, therefore, finds that the principal 
perpetrator tortured Victim A by raping her for a discriminatory purpose. 
[...] The Chamber finds that by encouraging a crowd to rape women 
because of their ethnicity, the Accused was encouraging the crowd to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering for discriminatory purposes. 
Therefore, he was instigating not only rape, but rape for a discriminatory 
purpose, which legally constitutes torture. [...] Therefore, the Chamber 
finds that the Accused is criminally responsible for instigating torture as a 
crime against humanity.”250 
As for the ICC, it should be noted that the Elements of Crimes adopt two 
different definitions of torture, as either a crime against humanity or a war 
crime. As for torture as a crime against humanity, the Elements of Crimes 
list the following elements:  
(1) The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
upon one or more persons.  
(2) Such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the 
perpetrator.  
                                                 
249
  Jarvis, Michelle: “An Emerging Gender Perspective on International Crimes” in eds Boas, 
Gideon; Schabas, William A.: “International criminal law developments in the case law of 
the ICTY” (Martinus Nijhoff: 2003), page 157, at page 166; ICTY, case IT-96-21 
Prosecutor v Mucić et al. (Čelebići Camp), Trial Chamber Judgment of 16 November 1998, 
para 494 
250
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-20 Prosecutor v Semanza, Trial Chamber Judgment of 15 May 2003, 
paras 481-485 
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(3) Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in 
or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
251
   
(contextual elements omitted).  
Regarding torture as a war crime, the elements are: 
(1) The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
upon one or more persons.  
(2) The perpetrator inflicted the pain or suffering for such purposes as: 
obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or 
coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
252
  
(contextual elements omitted).  
This second definition is quite similar to the definition in Kunarac. 
So far there have been no convictions of rape as torture before the ICC. 
However, regardless of the difference in definition of rape, it seems that the 
ICC will undoubtedly recognize rape as torture. In the case against 
Mbarushimana, the Prosecutor charged the accused with torture as a crime 
against humanity and a war crime, inflicted through acts of rape.
253
 
However the Pre Trial Chamber declined to confirm the charges, as it found 
that were no substantial grounds to believe the accused was individually 
responsible for the crimes committed.
254
 The ICC prosecutor has also 
charged rape as torture in Mudacumura.
255
 There are a number of other 
cases where torture was charged by the Prosecutor, but from the available 
documents it is unclear whether the charges were based on acts of rape. 
4.5 Prosecution of rape 
The ad hoc tribunals have made a great contribution towards ending the 
impunity of sexual violence crimes in international law. They were the first 
international criminal tribunals to have dealt extensively with crimes of 
                                                 
251
  ICC Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(f) 
252
  ICC Elements of Crimes, Articles 8(2)(a)(ii)-1 and 8(2)(c)(i)-4 
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  ICC, case ICC-01/04-01/10 The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest of 28 September 2010, pages 8-9 
254
  ICC, case ICC-01/04-01/10 The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision declining 
to confirm the charges of 16 December 2011, para 340 
255
  ICC, case ICC-01/04-01/12 The Prosecutor v Sylvestre Mudacumura, Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 of 13 July 2012, para 50 
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sexual violence in times of armed conflict.
256
 Among the cases that have 
dealt with rape and other sexual violence crimes, Akayesu and Kunarac are 
probably the most important and groundbreaking. 
Akayesu represents the first time in international criminal law that an 
international tribunal defined the crime of rape and the first time that rape 
was classified as genocide. However, despite its importance for the 
prosecution of rape, the original indictment in Akeyasu contained no charges 
of sexual violence. As mentioned above, it was only when several witnesses 
spontaneously testified about the massive instances of rape that the Trial 
Chamber invited the Prosecutor to investigate the claims and file an 
amended indictment if necessary. A year later the Prosecutor filed an 
amended indictment which included rape and other inhumane acts, and 
thereby amended the count of genocide to also refer to sexual violence.
257
 
The Kunarac judgment was extremely important for the prosecution of 
sexual violence because it was the first time a commanding officer and the 
other accused were convicted as primary perpetrators of rape, rather than 
just responsible under command responsibility. Furthermore, “it was the 
first time that sexual violence crimes were rendered visible from the 
obscurity of ‘lesser’ concurrent sentences.”258 Kunarac was also the first 
case where sexual slavery was charged as enslavement and the first time the 
objectification of women as live pornography was prosecuted as a war crime 
before the ICTY.
259
 
However, despite their groundbreaking nature, Akayesu and Kunarac were 
also somewhat controversial, due to them criminalizing behaviour after it 
had already occurred (ex post facto). Before the judgments in Akayesu and 
Kunarac, rape was not explicitly recognized in international law as a crime 
against humanity.
260
 Rape was undoubtedly a violation of the Geneva 
Conventions and generally recognized as a war crime under international 
law, however, it was generally seen as an inevitable product of war, and was 
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  Schomburg, Wolfgang and Peterson, Ines: “Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence under 
International Criminal Law” in American Journal of International Law Volume 101, Issue 
1 (2007), page 121, at page 122 
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  Roca de, Inés Weinberg: “Prosecuting Gender Based and Sexual Crimes against Women: 
the Role of the International Courts and Criminal Tribunals” in ed Eboe-Osuji, Chile: 
“Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem 
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  Dixon, Rosalind: “Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian Law: Where to from 
Here?” in European Journal of International Law Volume 13, Issue 3 (2002), page 697, at 
page 699 
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  Ibid, at page 699 
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  McHenry, James R. III: “The prosecution of rape under international law: justice that is 
long overdue” in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Volume 35, Issue 4 (2002), 
page 1269, at page 1299 
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rarely prosecuted. Moreover, even though it was illegal as a war crime or a 
violation of the Geneva Conventions, rape had also not been defined under 
international law. For the ICTY, this meant that the tribunals had to develop 
a new definition of rape, although their mandate prohibited applying 
anything other than accepted definitions of international humanitarian law. 
As rape was not expressly defined as a crime against humanity when the 
events in Akayesu and Kunarac occurred, their prosecution was necessarily 
ex post facto.
261
 
However, although rape was not explicitly recognized as a crime against 
humanity, it was still considered as a crime. Firstly, previous international 
conventions and provisions of international law explicitly prohibited torture 
and enslavement and both of these crimes may also include rape. Rape may 
have, at least implicitly, been considered a crime against humanity under 
these other categories as well, even if it was not recognized as a specific 
crime. Therefore, the accused in Akayesu and Kunarac both committed acts 
which were clearly recognized as being criminal at the time when they were 
committed, although rape itself was not clearly and explicitly a crime 
against humanity and was not well-defined at the time it when occurred.
262
 
Along with Akayesu and Kunarac, the ICTR and ICTY dealt with rape and 
crimes of sexual violence in a number of other cases, some of which have 
already been mentioned above. As for the ICTR, rape was dealt in, for 
example,
263
 Bagosora,
264
 Gacumbitsi,
265
 Hategekimana,
266
 Kajelijeli, 
267
 
Kamuhanda,
268
 Mugenzi,
269
 Casimir Bizimungu,
270
 Bicamumpaka,
271
 
                                                 
261
  McHenry, James R. III: “The prosecution of rape under international law: justice that is 
long overdue” in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Volume 35, Issue 4 (2002), 
page 1269, at page 1300 
262
  Ibid 
263
  NOTE: the cases are listed per accused as on the ICTR website, with every accused having 
his own case number. However, often the proceedings were joined and several accused 
tried together in a single trial, changing the case number in the trial. 
264
  ICTR, case ICTR-96-7 Prosecutor v Bagosora, Trial Chamber Judgment of 18, December 
2008, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 14 December 2011: convicted for, inter alia, rape, 
verdict confirmed on appeal; the other 3 accused were acquitted of rape charges. 
265
  ICTR, case ICTR-01-64 Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi, Trial Chamber Judgment of 17 June 
2004, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 07 July 2006: convicted for, inter alia, rape, verdict 
confirmed on appeal. 
266
  ICTR, case ICTR-00-55 Prosecutor v Hategekimana, Trial Chamber Judgment of             
06 December 2010, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 02 March 2012: convicted for, inter alia, 
rape, verdict confirmed on appeal. 
267
  ICTR, case ICTR-98-44 Prosecutor v Kajelijeli, Trial Chamber Judgment of 01 December 
2003, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 23 May 2005: acquitted of rape charges, acquittal 
confirmed on appeal. 
268
  ICTR, case ICTR-99-54 Prosecutor v Kamuhanda, Trial Chamber Judgment of 22 January 
2004, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 19 September 2005: acquitted of rape charges, 
acquittal confirmed on appeal. 
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Mugiraneza,
272
 Muhimana,
273
 Musema,
274
 Niyitegeka,
275
 Nsengiyumva,
276
 
Kabiligi,
277
 Ntabakuze,
278
 Renzaho,
279
 Semanza,
280
 Ngirabatware,
281
 
Augustin Bizimungu,
282
 Gatete,
283
 Karemera,
284
 Ngirumpatse,
285
 Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko,
286
 Ntahobali,
287
 Nzuwonemeye,
288
 Sagahutu,
289
 and 
Nizeyimana.
290
 
                                                                                                                            
269
  ICTR, case ICTR-99-47 Prosecutor v Mugenzi, Trial Chamber Judgment of 30 September 
2011, appeal pending: acquitted of rape charges 
270
  ICTR, case ICTR-99-45 Prosecutor v Casimir Bizimungu, Trial Chamber Judgment of 30 
September 2011, appeal pending: acquitted of rape charges. 
271
  ICTR, case ICTR-99-49 Prosecutor v Bicamumpaka, Trial Chamber Judgment of 30 
September 2011, appeal pending: acquitted of rape charges. 
272
  ICTR, case ICTR-99-48 Prosecutor v Mugiraneza, Trial Chamber Judgment of 30 
September 2011, appeal pending: acquitted of rape charges. 
273
  ICTR, case ICTR-95-1B Prosecutor v Muhimana, Trial Chamber Judgment of 28 April 
2005, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 21 May 2007: convicted for, inter alia, rape, two of 
the rape convictions overturned on appeal, while others were confirmed. 
274
  ICTR, case ICTR-96-13 Prosecutor v Musema, Trial Chamber Judgment of 27 January 
2000, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 16 November 2001: convicted for, inter alia, rape, 
rape conviction overturned on appeal.  
275
  ICTR, case ICTR-96-14 Prosecutor v Niyitegeka, Trial Chamber Judgment of 16 May 
2003, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 09 July 2004: acquitted of rape charges, acquittal 
confirmed on appeal. 
276
  ICTR, case ICTR-96-12 Prosecutor v Nsengiyumva, Trial Chamber Judgment of 18 
December 2008, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 14 December 2011: acquitted of rape 
charges, acquittal confirmed on appeal. 
277
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-34 Prosecutor v Kabiligi, Trial Chamber Judgment of 18 December 
2008: acquitted of rape charges. 
278
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-30 Prosecutor v Ntabakuze, Trial Chamber Judgment of 18 December 
2008, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 08 May 2012: acquitted of rape charges, acquittal 
confirmed on appeal. 
279
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-31-DP, Prosecutor v Renzaho, Trial Chamber Judgment of 14 July 
2009, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 01 April 2009: convicted for, inter alia, rape, rape 
conviction overturned on appeal. 
280
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-20 Prosecutor v Semanza, Trial Chamber Judgment of 15 May 2003, 
Appeal Chamber Judgment of 20 May 2005: Acquitted of one charge of rape, convicted of 
the other charge of rape, rape conviction upheld on appeal. 
281
  ICTR, case ICTR-99-54 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware, case in progress, indicted for rape as a 
crime against humanity. 
282
  ICTR, case ICTR-00-56 Prosecutor v Augustin Bizimungu, Trial Chamber Judgment of 17 
May 2011, appeal pending: convicted of rape. 
283
  ICTR, case ICTR-00-61 Prosecutor v Gatete, Trial Chamber Judgment of 31 May 2011, 
appeal pending: acquitted of rape charges. 
284
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-24 Prosecutor v Karemera, Trial Chamber Judgment of 02 February 
2012, appeal pending: convicted for, inter alia, rape. 
285
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-28 Prosecutor v Ngirumpatse, Trial Chamber Judgment of 02 
February 2012, appeal pending: convicted for, inter alia, rape. 
286
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-21 Prosecutor v Nyiramasuhuko, Trial Chamber Judgment of 24 June 
2011, appeal pending: convicted for, inter alia, rape, including rape as genocide (however, 
she did not commit any of the rapes herself). 
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Of the above cases, an especially interesting one to note, perhaps, is the case 
of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, who was the first woman to be charged and 
convicted of genocide in international criminal law, and the first woman to 
be charged with inciting rape as a form of genocide. At the time of the 
conflict in Rwanda, she held the position of Minister of Family and 
Women’s Development in the Interim government of Rwanda. She was 
found to have been superior to the Interahamwe forces in her hometown and 
to have directly ordered killings, torture and rape of Tutsi women, especially 
ordering that they be raped before they are killed. 
As with the ICTR, the ICTY also dealt with rape in a significant number of 
cases, along with Kunarac. Therefore, rape and/or crimes of sexual violence 
were considered in cases against Bralo,
291
 Brđanin,292 Češić,293 Rasim 
Delić,294 Furundžija,295 Kvočka et al, 296 Mucić et al,297 Nikolić,298 Rajić,299 
                                                                                                                            
287
  ICTR, case ICTR-97-21, Prosecutor v Ntahobali, Trial Chamber Judgment of 24 June 
2011, appeal pending: convicted for, inter alia, rape. 
288
  ICTR, case ICTR-00-56 Prosecutor v Nzuwonemeye, Trial Chamber Judgment of 17 May 
2011, appeal pending: acquitted of rape charges. 
289
  Ibid 
290
  ICTR, case ICTR-2000-55 Prosecutor v Nizeyimana, Trial Chamber Judgment of 19 June 
2012, appeal pending: acquitted of rape charges. 
291
  ICTY, case IT-95-17 Prosecutor v Bralo (Lašva Valley), Trial Chamber Judgment of 07 
December 2005, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 02 April 2007: convicted of torture and 
outrages upon human dignity, including rape, conviction upheld on appeal.  
292
  ICTY, case IT-99-36 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Krajina), Trial Chamber Judgment of 01 
September 2004, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 03 April 2007: convicted of persecution 
and torture based on rape, torture charges reversed on appeal. 
293
  ICTY, case IT-95-10/1 Prosecutor v Češić (Brčko), Trial Chamber Judgment of 11 March 
2004: pleaded guilty of rape for forcing two brothers to perform oral sex on each other.  
294
  ICTY, case IT-04-83 Prosecutor v Rasim Delić, Trial Chamber Judgment of 15 September 
2008, died during appeal process: acquitted of rape charges. 
295
  ICTY, case IT-95-17/1 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Lašva Valley), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 10 December 1998, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 21 July 2000: convicted of torture and 
outrages upon personal dignity including rape, conviction upheld on appeal. 
296
  ICTY, case IT-98-30/1 Prosecutor v Kvočka et al. (Omarska, Keraterm & Trnopolje 
Camps), Trial Chamber Judgment of 02 November 2001, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 28 
February 2005: The accused (Miroslav Kvočka, Dragoljub Prcać, Milojica Kos, Mlađo 
Radić & Zoran Žigić were indicted with rape, however the Court rejected rape charges and 
found that they were subsumed under the crime of persecution, which included rape. 
Affirmed on appeal. 
297
  ICTY, case IT-96-21 Prosecutor v Mucić et al. (Čelebići Camp), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 16 November 1998, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 20 February 2001: Zdravko Mucić, 
Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo were convicted of torture through, inter alia, rape. Zejnil 
Delalić was acquitted of such charges. Convictions confirmed on appeal. 
298
  ICTY, case IT-94-2 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Sušica Camp), Trial Chamber Judgment of 18 
December 2003: pleaded guilty of persecution, torture and sexual violence, including rape. 
299
  ICTY, case IT-95-12 Prosecutor v Rajić (Stupni Do), Trial Chamber Judgment of 08 May 
2006: pleaded guilty of, inter alia¸ inhumane treatment including sexual assault. 
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Sikirica et al,
300
 Stakić,301 Tadić,302 Todorović,303 Zelenović,304 Haradinaj et 
al,
305
 Karadžić,306 Mladić,307 Prlić,308 Šešelj309 and Hadžić.310 
Sexual violence crimes were widespread during the conflict in Sierra Leone 
as well. Charles Taylor
311
 was convicted as an aide/abettor to, inter alia, 
rape and sexual slavery. Moreover, the accused in the AFRC case
312
 were all 
convicted of rape, while no convictions were entered on sexual slavery and 
forced marriage. However, in the RUF case,
313
 all the accused were 
convicted of rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage (to be discussed 
further below). 
Concerning the ICC, as has been stated before, currently the ICC has not 
convicted any accused of sexual violence crimes. However, rape has been 
present in all the situations the ICC has investigated and has been charged in 
                                                 
300
  ICTY, case IT-95-8 Prosecutor v Sikirica et al. (Keraterm Camp), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 13 November 2001: pleaded guilty of persecution, which for the accused Damir Došen 
included persecution through rape. 
301
  ICTY, case IT-97-24 Prosecutor v Stakić (Prijedor), Trial Chamber Judgment of 31 July 
2003, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 22 March 2006: convicted of, inter alia, persecution 
through rape, conviction confirmed on appeal. 
302
  ICTY, case IT-94-1 Prosecutor v Tadić (Prijedor), Trial Chamber Judgment of 07 May 
1997, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 15 July 1999: convicted of, inter alia, persecution 
through rape, conviction confirmed on appeal. 
303
  ICTY, case IT-95-9/1 Prosecutor v Todorović (Bosanski Šamac), Trial Chamber Judgment 
of 31 July 2001: pleaded guilty for forcing six men to perform oral sex on each other.  
304
  ICTY, case IT-96-23/2 Prosecutor v Zelenović (Foča), Trial Chamber Judgment of 04 
April 2007: pleaded guilty for, inter alia, rape. 
305
  ICTY, case IT-04-84 Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al, Trial Chamber Judgment of 03 April 
2008, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 21 July 2010: the accused were indicted with, inter 
alia¸ rape and persecution which included rape. They were acquitted, but the Appeal 
Chamber ordered a re-trial, which is currently ongoing. 
306
  ICTY, case IT-95-5/18-I Prosecutor v Karadžić, Indictment of 27 February 2009 and 
Marked-up Indictment of 19 October 2009: case currently in trial. Rape is prominent in the 
indictment as persecution and genocide. 
307
  ICTY, case IT-09-92 Prosecutor v Mladić, Indictment of 16 December 2011: case currently 
in trial. Rape is present in the indictment, primarily as persecution. 
308
  ICTY, case IT-04-74 Prosecutor v Prlić et al, Indictment of 11 June 2008: case currently in 
trial. The accused are indicted with rape.  
309
  ICTY, case IT-03-67 Prosecutor v Šešelj, Indictment of 07 December 2007: case currently 
in trial. The accused is indicted with, inter alia, persecution through sexual assault. 
310
  ICTY, case IT-04-75 Prosecutor v Hadžić, Indictment of 22 July 2011: case in pre-trial 
stage. Indictment includes persecution through, inter alia, sexual assault. 
311
  SCSL, The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, Trial Chamber Judgment of 18 May 2012, appeal 
pending. 
312
  SCSL, case SCSL-04-16 The Prosecutor vs. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC Case), Trial 
Chamber Judgment of 20 June 2007, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 22 February 2008. 
313
  SCSL, case SCSL-04-15 The Prosecutor vs. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF Case), Trial 
Chamber Judgment of 02 March 2009, Appeal Chamber Judgment of 26 October 2009 
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11 of the 16 cases so far: in Katanga and Chui,
314
 Bemba Gombo,
315
 
Muthaura and Kenyatta,
316
 Mbarushimana,
317
 Ntaganda,
318
 
Mudacumura,
319
 Kony et al,
320
 Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb,
321
 Al 
Bashir,
322
 Muhammad Hussein
323
 and Gbago.
324
 
                                                 
314
  ICC, case ICC-01/04-01/07 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Decision on the confirmation of charges of 26 September 2008: charges confirmed, 
charged with rape and sexual slavery. 
315
  ICC, case ICC-01/05-01/08 The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the 
Confirmation of charges of 15 June 2009: charges confirmed, charged with rape. 
316
  ICC, case ICC-01/09-02/11 The Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta, Decision on the confirmation of charges of 23 January 2012: charges confirmed, 
charged with rape. Confirmation of charges against Mohammed Hussein Ali declined. 
317
  ICC, case ICC-01/04-01/10 The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision declining 
to confirm the charges of 16 December 2011: Pre Trial Chamber declined to confirm 
charges, charged with rape. 
318
  ICC, case ICC-01/04-02/06 The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, Second warrant of arrest of 
13 July 2012: at large, charged with rape and sexual slavery. 
319
  ICC, case ICC-01/04-01/12 The Prosecutor v Sylvestre Mudacumura, Warrant of arrest of 
13 July 2012: at large, charged with rape. 
320
  ICC, case ICC-02/04-01/05 The Prosecutor v Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo 
and Dominic Ongwen, Warrant of arrest of 08 July 2005: at large, Kony and Otti charged 
with rape and sexual salvery. 
321
  ICC, case ICC-02/05-01/07 The Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) 
and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), Warrant of arrest of 27 April 
2007: at large, charged with rape.  
322
  ICC, case ICC-02/05-01/09 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Second 
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5. Sexual slavery 
5.1 Introduction 
Despite its prevalence in armed conflicts, for a long time sexual slavery was 
not recognized as a distinct crime in international law. It was listed as a 
separate crime for the first time in the Rome Statute of the ICC: Article 
7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute expressly lists sexual slavery as a crime against 
humanity, while Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) expressly list it as a 
war crime. However, it must be noted that prior to sexual slavery being 
expressly recognized as a crime in international law it was prohibited as a 
form of enslavement, the prohibition of which is a jus cogens norm of 
customary international law.
325
  
Sexual slavery is closely linked to two other international crimes, 
enslavement and forced prostitution. In fact, while it was accepted that 
sexual slavery should be considered as a separate crime, questions arose 
about what the differences between sexual slavery and enforced prostitution 
and enslavement are.  
5.2 Sexual slavery, enforced prostitution 
and enslavement - differences 
Enforced prostitution has a much longer history in international law and has 
been listed in legal documents since the 1900’s.326 However, during the 
drafting of the Rome Statute the question arose whether references to both 
enforced prostitution and sexual slavery were necessary. Some considered 
that enforced prostitution was an outdated term, which was subsumed by the 
wider term “sexual slavery.” They argued that the term “enforced 
prostitution” reflected a male view, that it was discriminatory towards 
women, that it implied a level of voluntarism, that it does not convey the 
serious nature of the crime, etc. Hence, the term sexual slavery is more 
appropriate.
327
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Others claimed that sexual slavery and enforced prostitution are different 
crimes, which have different elements. They argue that enforced prostitution 
should not be subsumed by sexual slavery because the term slavery is not 
the same during peace and wartime. That is, that there might be cases where 
women are coerced to act as prostitutes, but not in a slave-like position. In 
such situations, although most cases of enforced prostitution would be 
covered by the crime of sexual slavery, it could be beneficial to keep the 
category of enforced prostitution to cover such, rare, situations.
328
 Since no 
clear answer could be found for the above questions (whether or not acts of 
enforced prostitution can always be considered as sexual slavery), it was 
decided to expressly list both crimes in the Rome Statute. 
Regarding the crime of enslavement, it was claimed that sexual slavery was 
basically a form of enslavement and that, in order to reduce overlaps and 
repetition, it was not necessary to list sexual slavery separately but that a 
subsection could be added to the crime of enslavement.  
While sexual slavery is, in essence, a form of enslavement, many disagreed 
with this proposal. Some of the arguments for express recognition of sexual 
slavery are as follows: 
- that the term sexual slavery more accurately described and 
characterized the essence and nature of the crime;  
- that sexual slavery was a contemporary form of enslavement that 
occurred often and should be expressly named;  
- that such explicit reference to sexual slavery would advance 
international criminal law and its recognition of crimes of sexual 
violence;  
- that the prohibition of slavery can have an exception in international 
humanitarian law while prohibition of sexual slavery cannot.
329
 
Therefore, both the crimes of enslavement and of sexual slavery were 
expressly listed in the Rome Statute, although, as noted, overlaps exist 
between them. Another crime that can be considered similar to sexual 
slavery, which has not been explicitly recognized by the Rome Statute, is 
the crime of forced marriage, first charged before the SCSL. However, these 
similarities will be mentioned when discussing forced marriage in section 
10 below. 
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5.3 Elements of the crime of sexual 
slavery before the ICC 
Prior to the definition of sexual slavery, the definition of “slavery” itself was 
given for the first time in the Slavery Convention,
330
 as “the status or 
condition of a person over whom any or all the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership are exercised.” This was considered as also including sexual 
access through rape of other forms of sexual violence.
331
 
 
Sexual slavery is expressly listed in Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute, 
however no details are listed. Instead, what constitutes the crime of sexual 
slavery is described in detail in the ICC Elements of Crimes, in Article 
7(1)(2)(g)-2 for crimes against humanity, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2 for war 
crimes in international armed conflicts and Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-2 for war 
crimes in non-international armed conflicts. The first two elements of sexual 
slavery both as crimes against humanity and war crimes are identical, with 
the only difference being the different contextual and mental elements 
needed for crimes against humanity and war crimes.  
The elements of the crime of sexual slavery are that: 
1.  The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them 
a similar deprivation of liberty.
332
  
2.  The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or 
more acts of a sexual nature. 
(contextual and mental elements omitted) 
As has been stated above, sexual slavery is essentially a particularly serious 
form of enslavement. Therefore, the first element of sexual slavery is 
identical to the first element of the crime of enslavement.
333
 Enslavement 
can take various forms, such as chattel slavery
334
 and other practices which 
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involve exercising powers attaching to the right of ownership over a 
person.
335
 Examples of practices that are included under enslavement are 
capturing, acquiring, selling or exchanging persons with the intent of 
reducing them to slavery, selling, lending or bartering persons, trafficking in 
persons (especially women and children), forced labour, debt bondage and 
other practices by which the perpetrator exercises the right of ownership 
over other persons. 
While the first element is identical the second, additional, element sets 
sexual slavery apart from enslavement: that the perpetrator caused the 
victim(s) to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature. This means that, 
in addition to limitations on the victim's autonomy, the ability to decide 
matters relating to his or her sexual activity is the identifying element of 
sexual slavery.
336
 The clearest examples of cases of sexual slavery would be 
Japanese comfort camps or rape camps established during the conflict in 
Former Yugoslavia. 
Certain commentators and women’s groups have criticized the above 
elements on the basis that the language of the elements and the illustrative 
list could be interpreted narrowly and that it overly emphasizes commercial 
transaction or similar deprivations of liberty. However, it has also been 
argued that such criticisms and concerns are somewhat unfounded.
337
 
5.4 Prosecution of sexual slavery 
As of yet, no persons have been convicted of sexual slavery before the ICC 
under Article 7(1)(g) (crimes against humanity) or Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) or 
8(2)(e)(vi) (war crimes) of the Rome Statute. However, the crime of sexual 
slavery is present in several cases from the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Uganda that have not yet come to trial or which are currently in trial 
proceedings. 
Firstly, in a case that is currently under trial,
338
 Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui have been charged with committing, through other 
persons, sexual slavery as a crime against humanity and as a war crime 
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during the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Katanga 
and Chui were the commanders of ethnic armed groups in the Congo and 
the charges against them are a result of their military attacks on the Bogoro 
village in the North-East of Congo, where atrocities were committed against 
the local population. 
According to the majority of the Pre Trial Chamber in the Decision on 
Confirmation of Charges, there were substantial grounds for the belief that 
the forces led by Katanga and Chui had committed crimes against humanity, 
as they “(i) abducted women and/or girls from villages or areas 
surrounding the camps for the purpose of using them as their ‘wives’; (ii) 
forced and threatened women and/or girls to engage in sexual intercourse 
with combatants and to serve as sexual slaves for combatants and 
commanders alike; and (iii) captured and imprisoned women and/or girls to 
work in a military camp servicing the soldiers. [...] The women were taken 
to camps where they were kept as prisoners in order to provide domestic 
services, including cooking and cleaning, and to engage in forced sexual 
acts with combatants and commanders.”339  
Moreover, the majority of the Pre Trial Chamber also found that there were 
substantial grounds for the belief that the forces led by Katanga and Chui 
committed the war crime of sexual slavery. The Prosecutor alleges that 
women in Bogorowere were raped and forcibly taken to military camps 
where they were sometimes given as “wives” to their captors or kept in the 
camp's prison, which was a hole dug in the ground, where they were 
repeatedly raped by soldiers, commanders and soldiers who were punished 
and sent to the “prison”.340 
The majority of the Pre Trial Chamber concluded that “there is sufficient 
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that civilian women 
were abducted from the village of Bogoro after the attack, imprisoned, and 
forced into becoming the 'wives' of FNI/FRPI combatants, required to cook 
for and obey the orders of FNI or FPRI combatants. [...] The Chamber also 
finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that these civilian women were forced to engage in acts of a sexual 
nature.”341  
It must be noted that the Decision by the Pre Trial Chamber was made by a 
majority of judges. Judge Anita Ušacka partly dissented, especially with 
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regards to the charges of sexual slavery. She considered that the evidence 
offered was not sufficient to establish substantial grounds that Katanga and 
Chui were responsible for rape and sexual slavery, as “the Prosecution did 
not provide any direct evidence that Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui intended the common plan to attack Bogoro village to 
include rape or sexual slavery. For example, the Prosecution did not 
present evidence that either Germain Katanga or Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
directly ordered, suggested or induced members of the FNI/FRPI to commit 
rape or sexual slavery. Neither did the Prosecution present evidence that 
the suspects expressly agreed that rape and sexual slavery would be 
committed during the attack on Bogoro village, or even that in the aftermath 
of the Bogoro attack, the suspects were present when the crimes of rape 
and/or sexual slavery were committed.”342 
Staying with the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the case 
against Bosco Ntaganda (who is still at large), the Prosecutor submitted that 
Ntaganda was responsible for, inter alia, sexual slavery as a crime against 
humanity and as a war crime. In the Second Warrant for Arrest, the Pre Trial 
Chamber II stated that “[t]he Prosecutor submits that, from September 2002 
to September 2003, Lendu and other non-Hema ‘female civilians’ were 
abducted, systematically raped, and subjected to other forms of sexual 
violence as part of the UPC/FPLC policy to gain control over Ituri. [...] On 
the basis of the facts presented in the material, the Chamber finds that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe, that crimes of rape and sexual slavery 
were committed as part of the attacks in different locations in Ituri [...].”343 
And finally, the crime of sexual slavery is also present in the case against 
Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen (all at 
large) regarding the situation in Uganda.
344
 However, it must be noted that 
the Warrants for Arrest only submit that Kony and Otti are responsible for 
sexual slavery as a crime against humanity, while they do not state the same 
for the other accused (“NOTING that the evidence submitted, including 
REDACTED, suggests that some of the abducted REDACTED were 
REDACTED ‘threatened, beaten and raped’; that REDACTED; that 
REDACTED indicated that the abduction REDACTED and REDACTED 
sexual enslavement occurred ‘in fulfilment of orders given by Otti and 
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Kony’).”345 However, the Warrants for Arrest are so heavily redacted that 
not much can be seen from them regarding the crime of sexual slavery. 
As regards the ICTY, firstly it should be noted that sexual slavery as a 
separate crime is not listed under the Statute of the ICTY. The Statute, in 
Article 5 on crimes against humanity, mentions enslavement as a separate 
crime, as well as rape, which is the only gender based crime expressly listed 
in the Statute of the ICTY. Even so, the practice of the ICTY was important 
for the development and recognition of sexual slavery in international 
criminal law, because it was the first international court to rule on a case of 
sexual enslavement in the Kunarac case.
346
 
In the Kunarac case the perpetrators were found to have detained Muslim 
women and girls and continuously raped them, sometimes for months, lent 
them out and sold them to soldiers for the purpose of being raped. Since the 
Statute of the ICTY does not list sexual slavery as a crime against humanity, 
these acts were prosecuted as the crime against humanity of enslavement. 
However, the Prosecutor specified that the enslavement was done for sexual 
purposes (such as rape) and even though the Trial and Appeals Chambers 
analyzed the crime of enslavement, Kunarac is an important case when it 
comes to the crime of sexual slavery.
347
 
The Trial Chamber in Kunarac found that the objective element of the crime 
of enslavement was “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership over a person.”348 The relevant factors to establish this 
element of enslavement is whether one of the following elements exists: 
control of someone's movement; control of physical environment; 
psychological control; measures taken to prevent or deter escape; force; 
threat of force or coercion; duration; assertion of exclusivity; subjection to 
cruel treatment and abuse; control of sexuality; forced labour; and the 
buying, selling or inheriting of a person or his or her labours or services.
349
 
Of course, in the context of sexual slavery the most important element is the 
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control of another person’s sexuality, which is a specific indicator of sexual 
slavery.
350
  
The Trial Chamber also established that there is no need for a commercial or 
monetary element and that acquisition or disposal of someone for monetary 
or other compensation is not a requirement for enslavement.
351
 The Appeals 
Chamber then clarified that the definition of contemporary forms of slavery 
is different from the traditional definition of chattel slavery and therefore, 
the victim does not need to be subjected to the more extreme rights of 
ownership associated with “chattel slavery” in order for the act to qualify as 
sexual slavery.
352
 
And lastly, the Trial Chamber also clearly stated that the lack of consent is 
not a necessary element of the crime of sexual slavery (or enslavement for 
sexual reasons), which the Appeal Chamber confirmed: “[T]he Appeals 
Chamber does not accept the premise that lack of consent is an element of 
the crime since, in its view, enslavement flows from claimed rights of 
ownership; accordingly, lack of consent does not have to be proved by the 
Prosecutor as an element of the crime. However, consent may be relevant 
from the evidential point of view [...].” 353 
Similarly to the ICTY, the Statute of the ICTR does not list sexual slavery 
as a separate crime. The only gender-based crimes listed in the Statute are 
rape as a crime against humanity
354
 and rape, enforced prostitution and 
indecent assault as outrages upon personal dignity under Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions.
355
 Rape was an integral and planned part of 
attacks during the conflict in Rwanda and many judgements have found 
perpetrators guilty of rape as crimes against humanity but also as genocide, 
as seen above in section 4.4.1. However, to the best of my knowledge, there 
have been no judgements finding perpetrators guilty of enslavement for 
sexual reasons (sexual slavery), as there has been before the ICTY. 
The SCSL also recognizes sexual slavery as a distinct crime against 
humanity under Article 2(g) of the Statute. This is due to the fact that it was 
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established after the ICC and that its statute was largely modelled after the 
Rome Statute. It lists sexual slavery as one of the five enumerated crimes 
against humanity of a sexual nature (along with rape, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy and other forms of sexual violence).
356
  
Moreover, the SCSL was the first international criminal tribunal to charge 
and convict perpetrators of sexual slavery as a separate crime. The first 
charge of the crime of sexual slavery was in the AFRC case. However, due 
to procedural mistakes of the Prosecutor who charged the crime of “sexual 
slavery and any other form of sexual violence, a crime against humanity 
punishable under Article 2(g) of the Statute” under the same count of the 
Indictment, this charge was dismissed.
357
 The Trial Chamber found that it 
violated the rule against duplicity, as the accused were charged with two 
crimes under the same count which meant that the accused were unsure of 
which of the two crimes they should prepare a defence for.
358
 On appeal, the 
Appeal Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that the Indictment in the 
count for sexual slavery violated the rule against duplicity, but it did not 
agree with the form of remedy the Trial Chamber chose. However, no 
miscarriage of justice occurred so it was no necessary for the Appeal 
Chamber to correct the Judgement of the Trial Chamber in that respect.
359
 
However, after the AFRC case, a conviction for crimes against humanity of 
sexual slavery was achieved in the RUF case, a consequence being that the 
SCSL became the first international criminal court to convict for crimes 
against humanity of sexual slavery (as well as for the crime against 
humanity of forced marriage, which will be discussed later). The SCSL 
recognized that the crime of sexual slavery is not entirely new and that other 
perpetrators have been convicted for those types of acts, although under 
different names (for example, under the crime against humanity of 
enslavement in the Kunarac case).
360
 However, even though the particular 
crime of sexual slavery criminalized actions that were already criminal, the 
new name and the establishment of sexual slavery as a separate crime 
against humanity was designed to draw attention to serious crimes that have, 
as the Court stated, often been overlooked in history and that have been 
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used to humiliate and instil fear into the victims, their families and 
communities.
361
 
In the Judgement, the Trial Chamber described the necessary elements that 
constitute sexual slavery. They are that:  
1. the accused exercised any or all the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over one or more persons, such as purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such a person, or by imposing on them a similar 
deprivation of liberty;  
2. the accused caused such a person or persons to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature;  
3. the accused intended to exercise the act of sexual slavery or acted in the 
reasonable knowledge that this was likely to occur.
362
  
While the first two elements are the same, the third element is an addition to 
the elements of sexual slavery found in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC. 
The Court stated that the first two elements are the actus reus of the crime, 
and the SCSL refers to them as the slavery element and the sexual element. 
Regarding the slavery element, the SCSL relies on the ICTY’s Judgement in 
the Kunarac case, so that the slavery element can be indicated through 
“control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, 
psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, 
threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, to cruel 
treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.”363 
For the sexual element, the Prosecutor must establish that the accused 
caused the enslaved person to engage in sexual acts, which, together with 
the slavery element, constitute the crime of sexual slavery. The consent of 
the victim is not a necessary element, because the slavery element 
presupposes that the penetrator has ownership and control over the victim. 
In any case, the SCSL agrees with the ICTY Appeal Chamber that in certain 
circumstances it is impossible to express consent and that the existence of 
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those circumstances is sufficient to assume that consent does not exist,
364
 
such as in the Kunarac case before the ICTY.  
The RUF Trial Chamber also noted a few circumstances that can establish 
the slavery element, such as, for example, giving drugs to the victim in order 
to further control her.
365
 It also confirmed that slavery existed even if the 
victims were not physically confined, but were unable to leave as they 
feared for their lives and had nowhere else to go.
366
 As for the necessary 
mens rea element the Trial Chamber stated that it is satisfied if the accused 
intended to exercise the act of sexual slavery or acted in the reasonable 
knowledge that this was likely to occur. 
On appeal the accused attempted to challenge the Trial Chamber’s decision 
that there was no consent by the victims. However, the Appeal Chamber did 
not agree, and repeated that the Trial Chamber correctly found that there 
was no consent and that, in any case, consent is not an element of the crime 
of sexual slavery. It is a form of enslavement to which consent is not 
possible.
367
 Therefore, the Appeal Chamber confirmed the findings of the 
Trial Chamber regarding sexual slavery. 
It is likely that the ICC will closely examine the Judgements of the SCSL 
regarding sexual slavery, as the ICC Prosecutor has charged Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, for their acts in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, with sexual slavery as a crime against humanity.
368
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6. Enforced prostitution 
6.1 Introduction 
Like sexual slavery, the crime of enforced prostitution was also listed as a 
separate crime for the first time in the Rome Statute of the ICC. Enforced 
prostitution is listed as a crime against humanity
369
 and, as with the other 
gender based crimes, a war crime.
370
 However, even before enforced 
prostitution was expressly listed as a distinct international crime, it existed 
in international humanitarian law as an “attack to women’s honour” in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention,
371
 as well as in Additional Protocol I
372
 and 
Additional Protocol II,
373
 where it is listed under “outrages upon personal 
dignity.” Enforced prostitution is a crime which can be committed against 
both sexes. However, in practice in armed conflicts it is almost always 
committed against women.  
6.2 Elements of forced prostitution 
before the ICC 
Under the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, forced prostitution as a crime 
against humanity and as a war crime has two common elements:
374
 
1.  The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such 
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or 
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or 
such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent. 
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2.  The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain 
pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with the 
acts of a sexual nature. 
As we can see from the above, the first element requires that the perpetrator 
causes another person to engage in sexual acts without that person’s 
consent, while the second element requires that the perpetrator or another 
person obtained an advantage from or for these sexual acts. This second 
element characterizes the crime of enforced prostitution and distinguishes it 
from other crimes, such as sexual slavery: enforced prostitution requires a 
person obtaining or expecting to obtain pecuniary or other advantages in 
exchange for the sexual acts, while sexual slavery does not.
375
 As has been 
stated above regarding sexual slavery, these elements were heavily criticized 
from certain commentators.
376
 
The crime of sexual slavery does not require a commercial exchange or 
superiority, because the main focus of the crime is on the exercise of powers 
or ownership rights. The commercial exchange can exist in sexual slavery as 
well, through the purchase, sale or bartering of a victim. However enforced 
prostitution also requires that the person expects to gain a pecuniary or other 
advantage from the sexual acts, which is not a requirement for sexual 
slavery. Hence, it might be possible that sexual services with pecuniary or 
other advantages could constitute both the crime of sexual slavery and 
enforced prostitution.
377
 
In fact, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed 
Conflict, “sexual slavery also encompasses most, if not all forms of forced 
prostitution. The terms ‘forced prostitution’ or ‘enforced prostitution’ [...] 
have been insufficiently understood and inconsistently applied. ‘Forced 
prostitution’ generally refers to conditions of control over a person who is 
coerced by another to engage in sexual activity.”378 Therefore, it has been 
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argued that enforced prostitution is a crime of sexual slavery and that such 
acts in an armed conflict could be easily prosecuted as sexual slavery.
379
  
6.3 Difference before enforced 
prostitution and sexual slavery 
As stated above with regard to sexual slavery, there was great debate when 
the Rome Statute was drafted about whether sexual slavery and enforced 
prostitution should constitute separate crimes or not. The debate centred 
around two issues: firstly, how a person might be forced to engage in sexual 
acts if he/she was not enslaved (sexual slavery), and secondly whether a 
benefit from the sexual acts was necessary, what might that benefit be and to 
whom should it accrue.  
Regarding the first issue, the drafters followed the lead given by the ICTY 
in the Furundžija case380 and the ICTR in the Akeyasu case381 regarding 
rape. Therefore, the ICC elements make it clear that physical force is not 
required in order to prove enforced prostitution and that the victim could be 
forced into prostitution through threats of violence, detention, duress or 
psychological oppression, express or implied, intimidation, extortion and 
other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation.
382
 
Regarding the second issue, it was decided that some form of monetary or 
other benefit in exchange for the sexual acts was necessary. If no benefit 
existed (for example, if a person kept women confined and offered them 
freely for sexual services), it would be an act of sexual slavery. Therefore, 
the material benefit element was adopted as it differentiates enforced 
prostitution from sexual slavery and other sexual crimes,
383
 and as it fits the 
ordinary meaning of the term “prostitution.”384 
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Therefore, although they are very similar, the distinction between sexual 
slavery and enforced prostitution should be understood. The elements of 
forced prostitution emphasise coerced engagement in acts of a sexual nature, 
while the elements of sexual slavery, on the other hand, emphasize the 
limitation of the victim’s autonomy. The term “prostitution” suggests that 
sexual service is a part of exchange. Even though the element of coercive 
circumstances is present, the women perhaps have no other option to 
survive, as, for example, in the case of DRC peacekeepers who offered cake 
or bananas in exchange for sexual services.
385
 Therefore, it can be argued 
that it is very important that the Rome Statute included enforced prostitution 
as a separate crime, because it covers situations where a person is forced to 
be a prostitute in order to get something necessary for their survival or to 
avoid further harm.  
6.4 Prosecution of enforced prostitution 
Finally, it must be noted that enforced prostitution, like sexual slavery, is 
not listed in the Statute of the ICTY. However, it is listed in the Statute of 
the ICTR, as a violation of the Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.
386
 Moreover, enforced 
prostitution is also expressly listed in the Statute of the SCSL, both as a 
crime against humanity
387
 and a war crime.
388
 However, to the best of my 
knowledge, there have been no cases before any of these courts or tribunals 
where enforced prostitution has been charged as a distinct crime.  
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7. Forced pregnancy 
7.1 Introduction 
Like sexual slavery, forced pregnancy was also criminalized for the first 
time by the ICC’s Rome Statute.389 Prior to this, forced pregnancy could not 
be found in any international criminal law or international humanitarian law 
documents. Following the lead of the ICC, the SCSL also included forced 
pregnancy in its Statute.
390
 
Like most of the other gender based crimes against women, although the 
crime of forced pregnancy is relatively new the acts themselves are not and 
have occurred throughout history, with evidence of this practice going back 
as far as 2500 years.
391
 However, it wasn’t until the armed conflicts in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda in the 1990’s that forced pregnancy 
came into the international community’s focus.  
It was reported that Serb forces raped and intentionally impregnated Croat 
and Muslim women and denied them access to medical facilities where they 
could terminate the pregnancies, thereby forcing them to bear “Serb 
children.” It was also reported that women were repeatedly raped until they 
became pregnant and that this was a part of a systematic plan.
392
 Similarly, 
after the genocide in Rwanda it was reported that raped women gave birth to 
between 2000 and 5000 children, sometimes called “children of hate.”393 
The point of these acts was for women to give birth to children which would 
be considered as being of another ethnicity or “ethnically impure.” These 
crimes also had a terrible impact on its victims: along with the traumas of 
the rape itself, their suffering was even greater and more complex as they 
had a child that was their own, but that reminded them every day of the 
horrors they suffered. Moreover, in addition to the stigma of rape, the 
pregnancy and birth of a child of the “enemy” might make the women even 
more isolated and ostracized by their family and society. 
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Following these reports from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, the 
international community chose to place greater focus on the crime of forced 
pregnancy. Therefore, the United Nations Vienna Declaration
394
 in 1993, the 
United Nations Beijing Declaration
395
 in 1995 and the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights in 1998
396
 all expressly named forced 
pregnancy, among other acts of sexual violence, as violations of human 
rights that must be eliminated. And finally, in 1998 the Rome Statute of the 
ICC became the first international criminal law or humanitarian law 
instrument to expressly criminalize forced pregnancy. 
7.2 Elements of the crime of forced 
pregnancy in the Rome Statute 
Like the previous crimes, the Rome Statute lists forced pregnancy as a crime 
against humanity
397
 and as a war crime.
398
 However, unlike the previous 
crimes of sexual violence, forced pregnancy is the only gender-specific 
crime that can be committed only against women. It is also the only sexual 
crime that has been explicitly defined in the Rome Statute itself:
 “‘Forced 
pregnancy’ means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made 
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This 
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws 
relating to pregnancy”.399 
The ICC Elements of Crimes simply reformulate the definition given in the 
Rome Statute without really clarifying it any further. They list the common 
element for the crime of forced pregnancy
400
 as: 
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1.  The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or 
carrying out other grave violations of international law. 
(contextual elements omitted) 
However, by analysing the above text, it is possible to break it down into 
several smaller elements: (i) that the victim is physically pregnant; (ii) that 
she is confined during the time she is pregnant; (iii) that the perpetrator has 
an additional intent that the pregnancy affects the ethnic composition of a 
population or an intent to commit other grave violations of international 
law.  
7.2.1 Pregnant 
Firstly, according to the definition of the crime, the woman must be 
“forcibly made pregnant”, meaning that the women must be physically 
pregnant, and that unsuccessful attempts to make her pregnant will not 
constitute forced pregnancy (for example, if a woman is unable to bear 
children). Instead, such cases would fall under other sexual crimes 
(unsuccessful attempts to make a woman pregnant could constitute rape, 
while confinement of a woman who is not pregnant could constitute 
enslavement or sexual slavery).  
The pregnancy must also be caused by “force”, and the standards of “force” 
in rape
401
 will be used by analogy for forced pregnancy. However, it is 
argued that not only acts which make a woman pregnant will be relevant for 
the concept of “force”, but also acts which prevent her from controlling her 
reproductive cycles. Therefore, if a woman is forcibly prevented from using 
contraceptives, it is argued that such acts could constitute evidence of forced 
pregnancy.
402
 
It should be noted that the act of “forcibly making a woman pregnant” does 
not necessarily have to be the same as rape. Rape, according to the ICC 
Elements of Crimes, requires penetration by a sexual organ or by an object. 
However, penetration by an object cannot impregnate a woman (unless, 
perhaps, the object is a medical instrument used for impregnation) and 
cannot, hence, be a part of the crime of forced pregnancy. While rape is the 
“common” method used to forcibly impregnate women, forced pregnancy 
does not necessarily have to involve penetration and covers any situation or 
technology by which a woman is made pregnant against her will (such as 
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medical experiments for example). Therefore, the phrase “forcibly made 
pregnant” only requires the finding that a woman is pregnant and that she 
was made pregnant forcibly, against her will.
403
 
7.2.2 Confined 
Secondly, it is necessary that the woman is confined so that she remains 
pregnant, although it is not necessary that she actually give birth to the 
child. The confinement itself is not clearly defined, however by analogy it 
can be equated with the war crime of unlawful confinement in the Rome 
Statute,
404
 which is defined as confinement to a certain location. Therefore, 
this element should be fulfilled if the woman was detained in any location 
where she was not at liberty to leave.
405
 
Since the crime of forced pregnancy is not exactly the same as the crime of 
unlawful confinement, or enslavement for example, the confinement of a 
pregnant woman must have a temporal element which is connected to her 
pregnancy. This means that, for forced pregnancy to exist, the woman must 
be confined from the time she is believed to be pregnant, to the time of the 
pregnancy’s termination, either by birth, miscarriage, abortion or by passing 
the limit when abortion can be performed.
406
 This would mean that the 
woman was forced to be pregnant and had no possibility of willingly ending 
the pregnancy. 
It must be noted that this element of forced pregnancy is the defining one. It 
separates forced pregnancy from other crimes and it is the actus reus of the 
crime. The essence of forced pregnancy is not in the forcible impregnation 
through rape or other means, but in confining a pregnant woman and forcing 
her to remain pregnant. Thus, the perpetrator of this crime is not the person 
that forcibly impregnates a woman, but the person that confines a pregnant 
woman in order for her to give birth to a child and thus affect the ethnic 
composition of a population.
 407
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7.2.3 Intent 
Finally, the third element necessary for forced pregnancy to exist is that the 
perpetrator has the intent of “affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law.” This 
additional intent element does not exist with any of the other sexual 
violence crimes and sounds similar to the dolus specialis required for the 
crime of genocide. This means that unless the perpetrator had the above 
intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population or of committing 
other grave violations of international law the crime of forced pregnancy 
cannot be found. An example would be if the perpetrator forcibly 
impregnated a woman and kept her pregnant not to affect the ethnic 
composition of a population, but because he wanted to have his own 
offspring. While such an act could fit under several other crimes, it would 
not be considered as forced pregnancy. 
Reading the definition of forced pregnancy, we see that there are actually 
two different and alternative requisite intents. The first one is that the 
perpetrator had the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population 
to which the victim belongs. Such were the reported cases from the armed 
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Muslim and Croat women were 
subjected to forced pregnancy in order to give birth to “Serb babies”. This 
first intent requires that the perpetrator and the victim are members (or 
thought to be members) of different ethnic groups.
408
 Otherwise, while the 
child would be a product of rape, it would not affect the ethnic composition 
of a population. 
However, it is argued that there is a certain vagueness regarding the 
definition of forced pregnancy: does a woman have to be made forcibly 
pregnant with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population, 
or is it sufficient that she is only confined with such intent? A textual 
analysis of the definition suggests that only the confinement requires such 
intent.
409
 
The second type of intent, that is to carry out other grave violations of 
international law, is wider and applies regardless of ethnic identity, race, 
religion or other circumstances. In brief, it will be left to judges to determine 
how to interpret this intent. It was included to cover situations such as 
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abuses by the military of their own civilians or biological experiments that 
might be conducted on women.
410
 
7.3 Forced pregnancy as genocide? 
As stated above, the Rome Statute criminalizes forced pregnancy as a crime 
against humanity and as a war crime. However, due to its characteristics, 
certain commentators have argued that forced pregnancy can constitute 
genocide as well and that, together with rape, it is implicitly incorporated in 
the crime of genocide, although it is not listed anywhere in the Genocide 
Convention or in the provisions on genocide in the statutes of any 
international criminal court or tribunal.  
For an act to be defined as genocide, it must fall under one of the five listed 
forms of genocide, as previously mentioned above. As for forced pregnancy, 
it is argued that it could fall under either causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group, or imposing measures indented to prevent 
births within the group. Commentators find support for this claim in the 
Akayesu
411
 and Musema
412
 judgments before the ICTR, where the Court 
found the accused guilty of genocide based on, inter alia, charges of rape.  
In Akeyasu, the Trial Chamber found that “[t]he rape of Tutsi women was 
systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women and solely against 
them. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi 
group - destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.” and in 
Musema the Trial Chamber stated that “acts of serious bodily and mental 
harm, including rape and other forms of sexual violence were often 
accompanied by humiliating utterances, which clearly indicated that the 
intention underlying each specific act was to destroy the Tutsi group as a 
whole.”413 Therefore, the ICTR created a clear link between crimes of 
sexual violence and genocide by causing serious bodily and mental harm.  
Moreover, the ICC’s Elements of Crimes when discussing the crime of 
genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm state that “[t]his conduct 
may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual 
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violence or inhuman or degrading treatment.”414 Therefore, due to the 
above, it is argued by certain commentators that forced pregnancy 
conducted with the intent of destroying a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group can constitute genocide through causing serious bodily or mental 
harm: “[S]ystematic sexual assaults to produce children of a different ethnic 
group and to destroy another group meet the definition of genocide and 
could thus be prosecuted as genocide.”415 As one commentator puts it, 
“[w]hen reproduction is used to proliferate members of one group and 
simultaneously to prevent the reproduction of members of another, it is a 
form of destruction.”416 
Furthermore, as stated above, it has also been argued that forced pregnancy 
can constitute genocide by imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group. This argumentation is, again, largely based on the ICTR’s 
statement in Akeyasu, where the Trial Chamber stated that “In patriarchal 
societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the 
father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is 
the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately 
impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give 
birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group. [...] 
Furthermore, [...] measures intended to prevent births within the group may 
be physical, but can also be mental. For instance, rape can be a measure 
intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently to 
procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led, through 
threats or trauma, not to procreate.”417  
Moreover, it is argued that when a woman is pregnant with the child of “an 
enemy” she cannot be pregnant with a child of her own group, and after 
giving birth to the “child of enemy” she might be too devastated to ever give 
birth again. Therefore, it is claimed that the trauma suffered by the victim of 
forced pregnancy could cause her not to procreate in the future and thus be 
considered genocide as it constitutes an imposition of measures designed to 
prevent births within the group. 
Another argument that can be used to support the treatment of forced 
pregnancy as genocide is the required special intent element which is similar 
                                                 
414
  ICC Elements of Crimes, Article 6(b), footnote 3. The term “this conduct” refers to causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to one or more persons from element 1. 
415
  Boon, Kristen: “Rape and forced pregnancy under the ICC Statute: Human dignity, 
autonomy and consent” in Columbia Human Rights Law Review Volume 32, Issue 3 
(2001), page 625, at page 663 
416
  Fisher, Siobhan: “Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocide” in Duke 
Law Journal Volume 46, Issue 1 (1996), page 91, at page 120-121 
417
  ICTR, case ICTR-96-4 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment of 02 September 
1998, paras 507-508 
 92 
to the special intent necessary for genocide, and which doesn’t exist for any 
of the other crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute. Since this intent 
requirement puts the focus on the attack of an ethnic group, it has also been 
argued that the crime of forced pregnancy is not actually concerned with 
protecting women as individual persons, but rather that it, like the 
prohibition of genocide, is designed to protect collectives, i.e. ethnic 
groups.
418
 
However, these arguments are not without criticism and other commentators 
argue that forced pregnancy cannot be considered as genocide. While it is a 
terrible act which causes great bodily and mental harm, the question is how 
can it destroy a group? They ask the question how the creation of life 
(although through horrible means) can be equated to genocide which is the 
worst kind of destruction of life and how the creation of individuals destroys 
a group.
419
 They also criticize the arguments that in patriarchal societies the 
identity of the child is based on the father, and state that “the ethnic 
composition of the group is not affected because the child will still in part 
belong to the mother's group. Children, after all, receive in equal parts 
genetic material from mother and father. [...] [T]o treat forced pregnancy 
as genocide is to substantiate the myth that identity is determined solely by 
the ethnicity of the father; it is to accept the notion that the mother's 
ethnicity is erased from the offspring. [...] Treating forced pregnancy as 
genocide is to validate the notion that a child must be ethnically and 
culturally pure to belong to a particular people.”420 
Moreover, further criticism is drawn from the claim that the special intent 
for forced pregnancy and genocide is not the same and that it cannot be 
presumed that the “intent to affect the ethnic composition of a population” is 
the same as the “intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial 
or religious group” and that the intent required for forced pregnancy always 
includes the intent to destroy a group, as this would turn every case of 
forced pregnancy (as a crime against humanity or war crime) into genocide, 
which is not what the drafters of the Rome Statute had in mind.
421
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7.4 Negotiations on the crime of forced 
pregnancy 
In order to understand the crime of forced pregnancy and the definition 
given in the Rome Statute, it is also necessary to consider its negotiation and 
drafting process. Forced pregnancy is one of the most contentious crimes in 
the Rome Statute, and which involved the most difficult negotiations. The 
result of these difficult negotiations can be seen in the definition of forced 
pregnancy. 
Women’s rights, and especially women’s rights to sexual autonomy and 
independence, are still a controversial and underdeveloped issue in some 
parts of the world. Therefore, the inclusion of forced pregnancy into the 
Rome Statute faced much opposition, especially from countries and 
organisations that opposed or outlawed abortion, such as the Holy See, 
Ireland, Poland, Arab States and anti-abortion NGOs. Their fear was that 
including forced pregnancy in the Rome Statute might affect their national 
laws on abortion and, more generally, promote women’s rights to 
reproductive self-determination.
422
 Moreover, some states believed that 
there was no need at all for a separate crime, but that forced pregnancy was 
a result of rape and the rape itself should constitute the crime, while the 
forced pregnancy should only be an aggravating factor of the rape.
423
 
This opposition led to the inclusion of clause. which is designed to protect 
national laws on pregnancy and abortion, in the definition of the crime of 
forced pregnancy in Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute: “This definition 
shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to 
pregnancy”. This means that states’ abortion laws are protected and isolated 
from the Rome Statute and that states have no obligation to allow abortion, 
even in cases of forced pregnancy as a crime under the Rome Statute, if they 
do not wish to do so. 
7.5 Prosecution of forced pregnancy 
The crime of forced pregnancy has so far not been charged or prosecuted 
before the ICC or the SCSL and it seems that the definition of the crime 
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itself makes it very difficult to prosecute. Specifically, the primary problem 
would be special intent that must be proven, which might make it an 
insurmountable task to prosecute forced pregnancy successfully.
424
 This 
additional element elevates the evidentiary requirements of forced 
pregnancy above all other crimes against humanity and war crimes, nearly 
to the level of genocide: in addition to the contextual elements of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes and ordinary mental elements for those 
crimes, the Prosecutor would have to prove an additional level of intent 
which, as demonstrated by prosecutions of genocide, can be very difficult to 
prove. 
Another potential problem with prosecuting forced pregnancy is that the 
actus reus of the crime, that is the confinement of a forcibly pregnant 
woman, might not be committed by the same person who forcibly 
impregnated her. In such case, the Prosecutor would likely have to prove 
two different crimes: first the rape (forcible impregnation) and then the 
confinement of a pregnant woman with the necessary intent. But to what 
extent does the rape have to be proven and what if the rapist was unknown 
or not found? And if the rapist was identified and present, would it mean 
that he would also, in a way, be tried in the trial of the perpetrator of the 
forced pregnancy? Another question relates to the perpetrator’s awareness 
of the forced pregnancy and the standard of such knowledge which must be 
proven.
425
 
Since forced pregnancy is a newly criminalized act it is likely that there are 
many more ambiguities. However, the evidentiary difficulties in prosecuting 
forced pregnancy, especially proving the requisite intent, might mean that it 
is unlikely we will see a successful prosecution of this crime before the ICC 
or the SCSL. 
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8. Enforced sterilization 
8.1 Introduction 
Like many of the gender-based crimes mentioned above, enforced 
sterilization was also expressly recognized for the first time in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. It is listed both as a crime against humanity
426
 and as a 
war crime.
427
 It is interesting to note that, although it accepted and listed all 
the other newly recognized crimes from the Rome Statute, the SCSL did not 
list enforced sterilization as a crime in its Statute. It should also be noted 
that, in addition to being a war crime and a crime against humanity, if done 
with the requisite intent enforced sterilization will without doubt constitute 
genocide, under the heading “imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group”. In fact, forced sterilization is perhaps one of the main 
measures that could be used to prevent births within a group. 
Although forced sterilization was expressly listed for the first time in the 
Rome Statute, these acts were prosecuted before, in the Medical case before 
the Nuremburg Tribunal
428
 in the aftermath of World War II. In the Medical 
Case several Nazi doctors were found guilty of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes under the Control Council Law No 10,
429
 for conducting mass 
medical experiments in the Nazi Auschwitz and Ravensbruck concentration 
camps, among which was also the enforced sterilization of victims.
430
  
Inclusion of enforced sterilization in the Rome Statute was inspired by these 
events, but also by reports of violent sexual acts committed during armed 
conflicts which resulted in severe reproductive damage, such as 
sterilization.
431
 Although enforced sterilization is listed among sexual 
crimes in the Rome Statute, some claim that it does not belong there, since 
enforced sterilization is not necessarily a result of sexual violence. It can 
also be the result of medical procedures or medical experiments, such as 
operations, use of drugs for sterilization, etc. However, enforced 
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sterilization can also be a consequence of sexual acts, such as sexual 
mutilation, rape with objects or violent rape, of sexually transmitted 
diseases, failed abortions, etc.
432
 This is likely why it was listed among 
crimes of sexual violence.  
8.2 Elements of enforced sterilization 
The common elements of enforced sterilization in the ICC are:
433
 
1.  The perpetrator deprived one or more persons of biological 
reproductive capacity.
434
  
2.  The conduct was neither justified by the medical or hospital treatment 
of the person or persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine 
consent.
435
 
(contextual elements omitted) 
It should be noted that the text of these elements is gender-neutral, meaning 
that the crime of enforced sterilization can be committed against both men 
and women. The statute also adopts a wide approach towards the method 
through which enforced sterilization can occur, so it does not limit it to only 
physical operations or removals of organs, for example, and includes other 
medical or chemical means, as well as any other means through which a 
person is deprived of biological reproductive capacity (such as by sexual 
violence, as mentioned above). 
However, the deprivation of biological reproductive capacity cannot be 
purely temporary and must be permanent. This is evident in the footnote 
added to element 1, which states that “[t]he deprivation is not intended to 
include birth-control measures which have a non-permanent effect in 
practice.” Therefore purely temporary birth control methods, the effects of 
which pass with time, would not constitute the crime of enforced 
sterilization. However, it should be noted that if temporary methods of birth 
                                                 
432
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control were constantly repeated so that they had a permanent effect in 
practice, it would constitute the crime of enforced sterilization.
436
  
Coming to the second element, it should be noted that just depriving a 
person of biological reproductive capacity is not in itself a crime, and that 
sterilizations can be lawful. Thus the second element determines which 
sterilizations shall be considered as an international crime. For example, 
sterilizations which were medically justified, even without the person’s 
consent, would not constitute enforced sterilization, and neither would 
medically unjustified sterilizations but which were done with the consent of 
the person. 
However, this element is footnoted as well. The footnote states that “[i]t is 
understood that ‘genuine consent’ does not include consent obtained 
through deception.” This footnote clarifies that the consent given must be 
voluntary and informed consent, by a person who understands the 
consequences of consenting to such a procedure. During the negotiations of 
the Rome Statute several delegations demanded that the term “voluntary and 
informed consent” be used so that situations of deception do not occur. Such 
situations include where the person is not fully informed of the 
procedure/medication or of the consequences it will produce. As a 
compromise, the above footnote was added to clarify that any consent 
obtained by deception will not be valid and such procedures could constitute 
war crimes or crimes against humanity.
437
  
8.3 Prosecution of enforced sterilization 
Finally, it should be noted that, in addition to there being scant literature on 
the topic, the crime of forced sterilization has so far not been brought before 
the ICC or any of the ad hoc tribunals (as other inhumane acts, for 
example). 
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9. Any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable 
gravity 
9.1 Introduction  
The previous five crimes of sexual violence are all now expressly 
recognized in international criminal law through the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, which also confirmed and codified existing customary international 
law at the time. As we have seen above, most of those crimes were 
expressly listed in international law for the first time in the Rome Statute.  
However, since, unfortunately, people’s imagination and potential for 
horrible acts towards others is endless, these crimes are not sufficient to 
cover all sexual acts which persons might be subjected to in armed conflict. 
Therefore, the last formulation of “any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity” was added to the Rome Statute, as an umbrella clause 
to cover other potential acts of sexual violence that might be committed 
during armed conflict. This inclusion of the clause results in the 
classification of such acts as crimes against humanity
438
 or war crimes.
439
  
This allows the ICC to prosecute even those sexual acts which are not 
expressly enumerated in the Rome Statute, but which might be of a similar 
nature or gravity to those that are, and to not leave them unpunished. For 
example, the Trial Chamber of the SCSL stated in the AFRC case,
 
that 
although it eventually dismissed the charge, “‘[a]ny other form of sexual 
violence’ in the context of crimes against humanity is a residual category of 
sexual crimes listed under Article 2(g) of the Statute [of the SCSL], and may 
encompass an unlimited number of acts. [...] The prohibition embraces all 
serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral 
integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force or 
intimidation.”440  
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery 
and slavery-like practices defined sexual violence as “any violence, physical 
or psychological, carried out by sexual means or targeting sexuality. Sexual 
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violence covers both physical and psychological attacks directed at a 
person’s sexual characteristics, such as forcing a person to strip naked in 
public, mutilating a person’s genitals or slicing off a woman’s breasts. [...] 
Sexual violence also characterizes situations in which two victims are 
forced to perform sexual acts on one another or to harm one another in a 
sexual manner.”441 
This formulation of “any other form of sexual violence of a comparable 
gravity” does not exist in the Statutes of the ICTY or ICTR, but it has been 
accepted, although slightly altered,
442
 in the Statute of the SCSL among the 
provisions on crimes against humanity.
443
 
It has been claimed that certain legal difficulties exist regarding this residual 
clause and the general residual clause for crimes against humanity of “other 
inhumane acts” in Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, as they seem to 
somewhat overlap. And indeed, the ICTY and ICTR, whose Statutes do not 
contain “any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” have 
treated such acts as “other inhumane acts”.444 However, that has not 
prevented the Rome Statute and SCSL Statute from using this formulation.  
9.2 Elements 
According to the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, the common elements of 
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity as a crime against 
humanity
445
 and as a war crime
446
 are: 
1.  The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or 
more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of 
a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as 
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or 
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or 
such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent. 
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2.  Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences in 
article 7, paragraph 1 (g), of the Statute. * (sexual violence as a crime 
against humanity) 
[2.  The conduct was of a gravity comparable to that of a grave breach of 
the Geneva Conventions.] * (sexual violence as a war crime) 
3.  The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the gravity of the conduct. 
(contextual elements omitted) 
The first and the third elements are identical for both crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The second element is, however, slightly 
different. The second element regarding sexual violence as a crime against 
humanity compares the gravity of the “other act of sexual violence” to other 
offences of crimes against humanity in Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute. 
The second element of sexual violence as a war crime, however, compares 
the gravity of the “other acts of sexual violence” to other grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions.  
The first element is designed to cover two different situations: firstly, 
situations where the perpetrator commits sexual acts against the victim 
him/herself and, secondly, situations where the victim is forced or coerced 
to perform sexual acts,
 447
 such as, for example, sexually molesting women 
(without intercourse), forced nudity, forcing victims to perform sexual acts 
on each other, or similar sexual acts which are not already enumerated. 
The second element, regarding crimes against humanity, was added in order 
to satisfy the principle of legality, i.e. the nullum crimen sine lege principle. 
It was feared that without this qualifying element, the category of “any other 
sexual act” would be too vague and would not offer certainty on what acts 
are included, thus violating the principle of legality.
448
 It should be noted 
that this element is not found in the Statute of the SCSL. Whereas the Rome 
Statute mentions “[...] any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity”, the Statute of the SCSL simply mentions “any other form of sexual 
violence.”449 
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Regarding war crimes, the term “any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions” in the Rome Statute was much debated. Some argued that this 
formulation indicated the conduct that would be prosecuted under this 
heading must also constitute one of the crimes already defined in Article 
8(2) of the Statute and in addition involve violent sexual acts. However, 
most delegations did not agree that this meant the act had to fall under one 
of the enumerated grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and so 
interpreted element two of the crime in the Elements of Crimes as simply 
stating that the conduct must be comparable to a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions.
450
 
The second element creates a threshold of seriousness, so that the acts 
warrant being described as crimes against humanity.
451
 There was some 
concern that this element meant that the acts in question have to be exactly 
like rape or resemble it. However, this element simply states that the act of 
sexual violence must be comparable in gravity to any of the crimes 
enumerated and this has been accepted to include a wide range of acts, 
including sexual acts that do not involve physical contact.
452
  
The third element deals with the mental element necessary. During the 
negotiations there was a disagreement among delegations whether the 
ordinary mental element of Article 30 of the Rome Statute
453
 should fully 
apply to these acts. In order to avoid a mistake of law defence, the 
formulation “awareness of the factual circumstances” was adopted as the 
most appropriate standard.
454
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9.3 Prosecution of any other form of 
sexual violence 
As stated above, the crime of “any other form of sexual violence” is only 
found in the Rome Statute and the Statute of the SCSL. However, all the 
tribunals, including the ICTY and ICTR, have dealt with sexual acts which 
do not fit in one of the enumerated sexual crimes in their Statutes. 
The ICC, so far, has not sentenced any accused for “other sexual crimes”. 
However, it has charged “other sexual crimes” in the case against Laurent 
Gbagbo, where the accused was charged with “rape and other sexual 
violence” as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome 
Statute. However, the Warrant of Arrest
455
 and the Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest456 either do not contain any 
information on the alleged crimes or are heavily redacted, so it is not 
possible to determine what acts the Prosecutor has qualified as “any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.” Moreover uncertainty 
continues as the charges have not yet been confirmed. 
As the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR only list rape as a sexual crime 
against humanity, any sexual acts (including those expressly listed in the 
ICC Statute, like sexual slavery) which do not fall under rape, have to be 
prosecuted on other grounds. Therefore, these courts have generally 
prosecuted other acts of sexual violence as crimes against humanity of 
“other inhumane acts”,457 although they could also constitute outrages upon 
personal dignity and serious bodily or mental harm. 
In Akeyasu the ICTR Trial Chamber stated that “[t]he Tribunal considers 
sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of a sexual nature which is 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual 
violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may 
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”458 
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Regarding examples of other acts of sexual violence which have been found 
to qualify as crimes against humanity or war crimes, the ICTR in 
Kajelijeli,
459
  found that mutilation of a woman’s breast and mutilation of a 
dead woman constituted a crime against humanity: “The Chamber found 
that […] the Interahamwe raped and killed a Tutsi woman called Joyce […] 
[and] that they pierced her side and her sexual organs with a spear […]. 
The Chamber found that […] a Tutsi girl named Nyiramburanga was 
mutilated by an Interahamwe who cut off her breast and then licked it. […] 
[T]hese acts constitute a serious attack on the human dignity of the Tutsi 
community as a whole. Cutting a woman’s breast off and licking it, and 
piercing a woman’s sexual organs with a spear are nefarious acts of a 
comparable gravity to the other acts listed as crimes against humanity, 
which would clearly cause great mental suffering to any members of the 
Tutsi community who observed them.”  
In Niyitegeka the ICTR also found that castration of a dead man and 
mutilation with a stick of a dead woman constituted other inhumane acts: 
“The witness then saw Mika cut off Kabanda’s head with a machete, and 
castrate him. […] The genitals were hung on a spike until the witness and 
others found them and buried them. The witness saw his body without his 
genitals.
460
 […] [T]he Accused ordered Interahamwe to undress the body of 
a woman who had just been shot dead, to fetch and sharpen a piece of 
wood, which he then instructed them to insert into her genitalia.”461 In its 
verdict, the Trial Chamber concluded: “Crime Against Humanity (Other 
Inhumane Acts) - The Chamber finds that the acts committed with respect to 
Kabanda and the sexual violence to the dead woman’s body are acts of 
seriousness comparable to other acts enumerated in the Article, and would 
cause mental suffering to civilians, in particular, Tutsi civilians, and 
constitute a serious attack on the human dignity of the Tutsi community as a 
whole.”462 
However, even less serious acts have been found to constitute crimes 
against humanity under the category of other inhumane acts.
463
 In Akeyasu, 
the ICTR Trial Chamber found that forced undressing and public display of 
women, such as public marching while naked and forcing victims to 
perform exercises while naked, constituted other inhumane acts: “[T]he 
Accused told the Interahamwe to undress a young girl named Chantal, 
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whom he knew to be a gymnast, so that she could do gymnastics naked. [...] 
As Chantal was forced to march around naked in front of many people [...] 
the Accused was laughing and happy with this.
464
 [...] [T]he three women 
were forced by the Interahamwe to undress and told to walk, run and 
perform exercises ‘so that they could display the thighs of Tutsi women.’ All 
this took place, she said, in front of approximately two hundred people. 
After this, she said the women were raped.”465  
Regarding sexual violence as other inhumane acts, the ICTY followed the 
ICTR’s Judgement in Akeyasu, as well as other cases, and confirmed in the 
Omarska, Keraterm & Trnopolje Camps case
466
 that “[…] sexual violence 
is broader than rape and includes such crimes as sexual slavery or 
molestation.” This sentence had a footnote, which further stated that 
“[s]exual violence would also include such crimes as sexual mutilation, 
forced marriage, and forced abortion as well as the gender related crimes 
explicitly listed in the ICC Statute as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, namely ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization’ and other similar forms of violence.” 
Finally, cases which deal with other acts of sexual violence as crimes 
against humanity have also appeared before the SCSL. Among the most 
important precedents of the SCSL was the recognition of forced marriage as 
a separate crime under Article 2(i) the SCSL Statute, under the category of 
other inhumane acts. Due to the significance of the judgements and the 
arguments that forced marriage should be a crime which is expressly listed 
and enumerated in international criminal law, forced marriage as a crime 
will be separately dealt with below. However, it is first important to note 
that the Appeal Chamber of the SCSL also stated that, regardless of the 
existence of the category of “other sexual violence”, sexual crimes can still 
be prosecuted as “other inhumane acts”: “The Trial Chamber therefore 
erred in law by finding that ‘Other Inhumane Acts’ [...] must be restrictively 
interpreted. [...] At the same time, care must be taken not to make it too 
embracing [...]. An over-broad interpretation will certainly infringe the rule 
requiring specificity of criminal prohibitions. [...] [T]he Appeals Chamber 
sees no reason why the so-called ‘exhaustive’ listing of sexual crimes under 
Article 2(g) of the Statute should foreclose the possibility of charging as 
‘Other Inhumane Acts’ crimes which may among others have a sexual or 
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gender component. The Trial Chamber therefore erred in finding that 
Article 2(i) of the Statute excludes sexual crimes.”467 
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10. Forced marriage 
10.1 Introduction 
The conflict in Sierra Leone was perhaps best known in the general public 
for mutilations of hands and other limbs, especially in relation to the mining 
of diamonds in Sierra Leone, and for the use of child soldiers. However, the 
widespread sexual violence against women was not as well covered. One of 
the most terrible crimes that women were subjected to was that of forced 
marriage. Marriage in this context means a relationship between a rebel 
(RUF and AFRC soldiers) and a civilian woman that lasts longer than the 
moment of capture or act of rape or sexual violence, as women were usually 
forced to live with their captor.
468
 The women were expected to have sex 
with their “husbands” whenever they demanded so, to be in an exclusive 
relationship with them, to show them loyalty, do domestic chores, have the 
“husband’s” children, and in general do whatever the “husband” demanded.  
The SCSL became the first international criminal court that expressly 
recognized forced marriage as a crime against humanity. The AFRC case 
was the first time that the Prosecutor brought the charge of forced marriage 
before the SCSL.
469
 He charged the accused with forced marriage as a crime 
against humanity under Article 2(i) of the Statute of the Court as “other 
inhumane acts.” However, even though the accused were found guilty for 
other crimes they were charged with, the Trial Chamber rejected the charge 
of forced marriage. One of the conditions for a crime to be accepted under 
other inhumane acts is that it is not the equal to another already listed crime 
so that it can be subsumed under that crime. The Trial Chamber therefore 
compared forced marriage with the crime of sexual slavery and found that 
they contained the same elements and that the Prosecutor did not manage to 
prove that the crime of forced marriage was significantly different from the 
crime of sexual slavery. The Trial Chamber concluded that forced marriage 
was subsumed under sexual slavery and that it resulted in duplicity of 
charges. Therefore, it rejected the charge of forced marriage.
470
  
However, the Appeal Chamber did not agree with the Trial Chamber and 
reversed the above finding in its judgement on appeal. It disagreed that 
forced marriage was completely subsumed under sexual slavery, and it 
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stated that “no tribunal could reasonably have found that forced marriage 
was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery. While forced 
marriage shares certain elements with sexual slavery […] there are also 
distinguishing factors.”471 The shared elements are that both forced 
marriage and sexual slavery involve non-consensual sex (rape) and 
deprivation of liberty, but they also have other elements: an element of 
exclusivity between the victim and perpetrator and a forced conjugal 
association which results in physical and mental suffering for the victim.
472
 
These elements mean that, in the Appeal Chamber’s opinion, forced 
marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime, like sexual slavery. 
10.2 Definition of forced marriage 
The Appeals Chamber defined forced marriage in Sierra Leone as a 
“situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct or those of 
someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a person by force, 
threat, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner resulting in severe 
suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury to the victim.”473 
The Appeals Chamber also stated that the forced “wife” had to perform 
various marital duties, such as regular sexual intercourse, domestic labour, 
such as cleaning, cooking, farming, giving birth to her “husband’s” child 
and to be loyal to her “husband”.474 To the Appeals Chamber this is enough 
to distinguish forced marriage from sexual slavery, which is dominantly a 
sexual crime, while forced marriage is not. 
The Appeals Chamber also concluded that forced marriage was of a similar 
gravity to other crimes against humanity. It stated that forced marriage 
inflicts grave suffering on the victims and that the severity of suffering is 
comparable to some listed crimes against humanity, such as, for example, 
rape.
475
 Women are often abducted by force from their homes and 
sometimes very young girls are taken as “wives.” The “marriage” often lasts 
for a long time, until the “husband” gets tired of his “wife” and oftentimes 
results in the woman not returning to her home or society for fear of being 
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labelled a rebel and a “bush wife.” However, it must be noted that the 
Appeal Chamber did not convict the accused of forced marriage. Although it 
rejected the findings by the Trial Chamber about forced marriage, it did not 
think that it was necessary to convict the accused of the crime.  
10.3 Elements of forced marriage 
Although the crime of forced marriage was charged for the first time in the 
AFRC case, accused (Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao) 
were only convicted of this crime was in the RUF case.
476
 In this case forced 
marriage was charged under “other inhumane acts” as crimes against 
humanity under Article 2(i) of the Statute. It was not charged under other 
forms of sexual violence in Article 2(g) of the SCSL Statute, as the 
Prosecutor characterized forced marriage as a multi-layered crime which is 
not only of a sexual nature. The Appeal Chamber for the RUF case 
supported the Trial Chamber’s findings on forced marriage and did not offer 
a different opinion. Considering that these cases before the SCSL were the 
first time a charge of forced marriage was attempted before an international 
criminal tribunal, there are still some unclear issues. The SCSL focused very 
much on the sexual aspect of forced marriage in Sierra Leone, but failed to 
completely evaluate other important elements of forced marriage.
477
 
However, from the above judgements in the AFRC and RUF cases, we can 
recognize the elements which must be fulfilled for forced marriage to be 
prosecuted as a crime against humanity. As the case law demonstrates, in 
addition to the general requirements the following elements are necessary to 
constitute the crime of forced marriage:
478
  
1.  The perpetrator conferred a status of marriage, through words or 
conduct, on one or more persons, by force or coercion. Examples of 
force or coercion include through fear of violence; duress; detention; 
psychological oppression or abuse of power against the victim; or 
taking advantage of a coercive environment or the incapacity of that 
person to give consent (even if women stay in the “marriage” it does 
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not automatically mean they have given consent and in any case it does 
not change the criminal nature of the act
479
);  
2.  The perpetrator caused such person to engage in conduct similar to 
that arising out of a marital relationship, including prolonged 
association, acts of a sexual nature, domestic labour, child bearing and 
other conjugal duties. 
Therefore, although the crime of forced marriage consists of elements of 
other crimes (such as rape, sexual slavery, enslavement, forced labour), it is 
more than just the sum of those crimes. The distinctiveness of the crime of 
forced marriage is the imposition of a marital relationship without the 
consent of the other party.
480
 The lack of consent means that the victim is 
being deprived of her individual autonomy and self determination and the 
totality of the elements causes great mental trauma to the victim. Therefore, 
forced marriage is more than just rape or enslavement, as the status of 
“wife” causes trauma to the victim and results in her exclusion from society. 
10.4 Difference between sexual slavery 
and forced marriage 
Although, as has been stated above, the crime of forced marriage is 
composed of other crimes such as rape, sexual slavery and forced labour, 
there are important differences between forced marriage and the 
aforementioned crimes, especially sexual slavery. In her Partly Dissenting 
Opinion of the AFRC Trial Chamber Judgment, Justice Doherty emphasized 
that even though forced marriage involves components of rape, sexual 
violence and enslavement, these are not the determinative factors for the 
existence of forced marriage. The crucial element is the mental and moral 
trauma which results from the imposition by threat or force of a forced 
conjugal association by the perpetrator on the victim.
481
  
Therefore, the focus is on the psychological suffering which is caused by the 
use of the label “wife” on the victim, which can lead to the victims’ 
stigmatization and the rejection of the victims by their families and 
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community. This would also cause prolonged mental suffering and make 
reintegration into the community almost impossible for the victims.
482
 This 
emphasis on the word “wife” and the imposition of a “conjugal status” in 
forced marriage, rather than on the sexual elements, is perhaps also justified 
because free consent in marriage is one of the essential principles of all legal 
systems,
483
 and is protected by various international documents.
484
 
Therefore, it is the imposed conjugal association (marriage) and the status of 
“wife” or (“bush wife”) that separates forced marriage from other similar 
crimes (such as sexual slavery).  
10.5 Forced marriage before the ICC? 
It was believed that the practice of the SCSL regarding forced marriage 
could perhaps also be relevant for the ICC in its future work, as the 
provisions
485
 on crimes against humanity in the statutes of both the SCSL 
and ICC are very similar. This may be attributed to the fact that the SCSL 
Statute is based on the Statute of the ICC. Even though forced marriage is 
not expressly listed in the Rome Statute, the ICC could also prosecute 
forced marriage as a crime against humanity under the category of other 
inhumane acts, like the SCSL.  
However, it seems that the ICC has ignored the jurisprudence of the SCSL 
on forced marriage and its findings that forced marriage is more than just a 
sexual crime. As stated previously, the ICC has charged sexual slavery in 
two cases, where it has stated that forced marriage is a form of sexual 
slavery. In the Katanga and Chui case in the Confirmation of charges, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber stated that “[i]n this regard, the Prosecution alleged that 
women in Bogoro: ‘[...] were raped and forcibly taken to military camps. 
Once there, they were sometimes given as a ‘wife’ to their captors or kept in 
the camp's prison, which was a hole dug in the ground. [...] The Chamber 
finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that civilian women were abducted from the village of Bogoro after 
the attack, imprisoned, and forced into becoming the 'wives' of FNI/FRPI 
combatants, required to cook for and obey the orders of FNI or FPRI 
combatants. The Chamber also finds that there is sufficient evidence to 
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establish substantial grounds to believe that these civilian women were 
forced to engage in acts of a sexual nature. [...] Witness 249 is a Hema 
civilian woman [REDACTED]. She was abducted, undressed, and raped by 
an Ngiti combatant at the village of Bogoro. Following death threats, she 
became the 'wife' of an Ngiti combatant, and was repeatedly raped. She had 
a child as a result of these rapes during her captivity. [...] In conclusion, the 
Chamber finds that there are substantial grounds to believe that the war 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery, as defined in article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the 
Statute, were committed by FNI/FRPI members.”486 
Moreover, the Pre Trial Chamber clearly stated that “[...] sexual slavery 
also encompasses situations where women and girls are forced into 
‘marriage’, domestic servitude or other forced labour involving compulsory 
sexual activity, including rape, by their captors. Forms of sexual slavery 
can, for example, be practices such as the detention of women in 'rape 
camps' or 'comfort stations', forced temporary 'marriages' to soldiers and 
other practices involving the treatment of women as chattel, and as such, 
violations of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery.”487 These paragraphs 
clearly demonstrate that the ICC has not followed the lead of the SCSL but 
rather has chosen to prosecute acts of forced marriage as the crime of sexual 
slavery. 
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11. Procedural issues  
Rape and other crimes of sexual violence are crimes whose effects extend 
past the physical trauma and injuries of the victim and which have 
significant psychological effects. These effects have been well documented 
and characterized as Rape Trauma Syndrome, which can manifest itself 
through nightmares, phobic reactions, sexual fears, and other symptoms.
488
 
The trauma of a particularly brutal rape or other brutal acts of sexual 
violence can also lead to the development of posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Moreover, the victims of crimes of sexual violence can also feel external 
effects, such as social isolation from their communities. This is particularly 
common in societies that emphasize a woman’s virginity and chastity before 
marriage. Victims of rape and other sexual violence crimes can also be 
shunned by their communities, husbands and wider families. Some women 
consider rape to be a fate worse than death, believing that a raped woman 
loses all value in her community.
489
  
In rape trials before domestic courts, defence strategies often include 
unwarranted attacks on the credibility of the victim, or other approaches 
which are intended to humiliate and intimidate the victim and establish that 
she is unreliable. Many of the same problems have also arisen before the 
ICTY, for example.
490
 Therefore, the sensitivity of prosecuting rape (as well 
as other crimes of sexual violence) in international criminal law has lead to 
a number of procedural protection mechanisms being introduced by the ad 
hoc tribunals and the ICC, in their Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
The relevant provisions in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the three 
discussed ad hoc tribunals are very similar, if not identical. The Statutes of 
both the ICTY and ICTR state that ”[t]he International Tribunal shall 
provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for the protection of victims 
and witnesses. Such protection measures shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the 
victim’s identity.”491 Furthermore, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
specify that a Victims and Witnesses Section shall be created as part of the 
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Registrar of the Tribunals, which shall “(i) recommend protective measures 
for victims and witnesses in accordance with Article 22 of the Statute; and 
(ii) provide counselling and support for them, in particular in cases of rape 
and sexual assault.”492  
The ICTR goes a bit further than the ICTY, and states that the Victims and 
Witnesses unit shall “(i) recommend the adoption of protective measures for 
victims and witnesses in accordance with Article 21 of the Statute; (ii) 
ensure that they receive relevant support, including physical and 
psychological rehabilitation, especially counselling in cases of rape and 
sexual assault; and (iii) develop short term and long term plans for the 
protection of witnesses who have testified before the Tribunal and who fear 
a threat to their life, property or family.”493 Both Tribunals stipulate that a 
gender sensitive approach should be taken when appointing personnel 
within this unit, where advantage should be given to qualified women.
494
 
Moreover, all the ad hoc Tribunals contain, in their Rules of Procedure and 
evidence, provisions regarding the protection of victims and witnesses 
before the Tribunals. Such procedures provide for the non-disclosure of 
documents or information to the public,
495
 non-disclosure of the identity of 
victims or witnesses,
496
 prevention of disclosure of the victim’s/witness’ 
identity or whereabouts or of persons related to them to the public or the 
media, through expunging names, assigning pseudonyms, giving testimony 
through image or voice altering devices, closed sessions, testimony through 
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one-way circuit television, etc.
497
 Moreover, the Rules stipulate that the 
Chambers shall control the manner of questioning to avoid any harassment 
or intimidation to the victims or witnesses,
498
 which is especially important 
when victims of sexual violence testify. 
The above provisions are general ones which may apply to all victims and 
witnesses regardless of the crime. However the most relevant and important 
provision in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunals that is 
specific for crimes of sexual violence is Rule 96.
499
 It provides that “[i]n 
cases of sexual assault:  
(i)  No corroboration of the victim’s testimony shall be required;  
(ii)  Consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim:  
(a)  Has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear 
violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression; or  
(b)  Reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might 
be so subjected, threatened or put in fear.  
(iii)  Before evidence of the victim's consent is admitted, the accused shall 
satisfy the Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and 
credible;  
(iv) Prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence or 
as defence.” 
As stated above, in regards to the issue of consent, this Article significantly 
limits the possibility of the accused to mount a defence based on the consent 
of the victim,
500
 as a defence on these grounds will be rejected on the 
presumption that the circumstances were such that no consent could be 
genuine. Such situations that result in an automatic rejection include 
detention, threats or oppression. Moreover, such a defence would first have 
to be heard in camera to be tested before the Chamber judges, before being 
put forward to the victim. Additional important rules protecting victims of 
sexual violence is that their testimony does not need corroboration and that 
their prior sexual conduct will not be relevant, as such issues are often used 
in national rape proceedings to intimidate or discredit the victims. This rule, 
that no corroboration of testimony of victims of sexual violence is required, 
                                                 
497
  ICTY, ICTR and SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 75 
498
  Ibid 
499
  In the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL 
500
  Jarvis, Michelle: „An Emerging Gender Perspective on International Crimes” in eds Boas, 
Gideon; Schabas, William A.: “International criminal law developments in the case law of 
the ICTY” (Martinus Nijhoff: 2003), page 157, at page 174 
 115 
is crucial as the victim is often the only witness of sexual crimes, unless 
they were committed publicly.
501
 
As for the ICC, its Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain many similar 
provisions as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ad hoc Tribunals, 
such as general provisions on protection of victims and witnesses before the 
court.
502
 The ICC also has a dedicated Victims and Witnesses Unit, with its 
tasks and responsibilities being set out in detail in Rules 16 to 19 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Specifically regarding sexual violence 
crimes, the Unit shall “[take] gender-sensitive measures to facilitate the 
participation of victims of sexual violence at all stages of the proceedings
503
 
[…] [make] available to the Court and the parties training in issues of 
trauma, sexual violence, security and confidentiality
504
 [and take] gender-
sensitive measures to facilitate the testimony of victims of sexual violence at 
all stages of the proceedings.”505 
However, the ICC goes further than the ad hoc Tribunals regarding the role 
and participation of victims in cases before the Court. Rule 85 provides a 
definition of victims as “(a) ‘Victims’ means natural persons who have 
suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; (b) Victims may include organizations or 
institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which is 
dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and 
to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for 
humanitarian purposes.” Moreover, the ICC has made a significant 
contribution to allowing victims’ voices to be heard before the Court. The 
ICC Statute pays special attention to the rights and interests of victims and 
goes beyond treating the victim simply as an aid in criminal proceedings 
and gives the victim legal standing in her or his own right.
506
  
For the first time in international criminal law, victims were given the right 
to participate in the proceedings, present their views and concerns in ways 
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which take into account their well-being, dignity and safety.
507
 Victims can 
make an application to the Chamber to participate in the proceedings (for 
example by giving opening or closing statements),
508
 they can have a legal 
representative (with financial assistance from the Court if necessary)
509
 who 
can participate in the proceedings, attend hearings, make submissions, apply 
to question witnesses, etc.
510
 Moreover, the ICC also contains provisions 
that allow victims to make a request for reparation or compensation, to be 
paid out from a trust fund set up for such purposes.
511
 
The ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain similar, although more 
extensive, provisions to the ad hoc Tribunals regarding crimes of sexual 
violence specifically. Rule 63(4) states that no corroboration is necessary to 
prove any crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, especially sexual 
violence crimes. Moreover, evidence of prior or subsequent sexual 
behaviour of the victim will be inadmissible.
512
 Regarding the issue of 
consent, a consent defence must also be tested in camera proceedings,
513
 
and the ICC places even more limitations on such a defence than the ad hoc 
Tribunals: “In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, 
where appropriate, apply the following principles:  
(a)  Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a 
victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a 
coercive environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary 
and genuine consent;  
(b)  Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a 
victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent; 
(c)  Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of 
resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence; 
(d)  Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim 
or witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior 
or subsequent conduct of a victim or witness.”514 
It should be noted that some feminist groups and legal scholars have taken 
the assumption that adopting broad legal provisions which limit or remove 
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defence possibilities are the only means by which women can be protected 
from the negative social judgments which are associated with sexual 
violence, and that such legal provisions can be a way that the 
disproportionately low conviction rate for sexual offences is addressed.
515
 
Even though the ad hoc Tribunals have made great advances in prosecuting 
sexual violence, it has also been argued that there have been relatively few 
prosecutions when compared to the real extent and severity of rapes during 
the conflicts, and that international law is inherently biased against women 
as it is created by men and in their interests, while women’s concerns are 
relegated to a special, limited category.
516
 Thus, it is argued, sexual violence 
is only addressed when the act is on such a large scale that it leads to 
destruction of a community, which implies that rape is not a wrong in itself, 
but is only constitutive of such if it is an assault on the community.
517
 
Nevertheless, in order to achieve legitimacy and follow international human 
rights standards, the limitations placed on the defence and the protective 
measures towards victims and witnesses must still ensure the protection of 
international due process rights of the accused. These rights are guaranteed 
in the Statutes of all the international criminal tribunals and must be 
balanced with the protection of victims and witnesses.
518
 However, many 
commentators have argued that some of the protective measures, especially 
victim and witness anonymity, violate due process rights of the accused, 
especially the right to confront the accuser. Commentators argue that this 
latter mentioned right is a fundamental part of due process rights
519
 that 
conflicts with witness anonymity.
520
 An example of how witness anonymity 
can work to the detriment of the defence was in the Tadić521 case, where an 
anonymous witness was found by the defence to be lying after being 
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threatened by government forces to claim he witnessed the acts in 
question.
522
 
On the other hand, even though a defendant’s right to confrontation has 
been read as meaning a right to meet face to face all those who appear and 
give evidence at trial, such a right is not meant as an absolute right to 
confront all witnesses, and it is undeniable that international criminal 
tribunals must employ special means to protect victims and witnesses. The 
right to confront accusers was born out of the limitation of the state’s 
powers, as “[o]ne technique which is always used to maintain absolute 
power in totalitarian governments is the use of anonymous information by 
the government against those who are obnoxious to the rulers.”523 While 
this is still crucial for domestic rape trials, in international criminal tribunals 
there is a collective governing body over which no one state has control. 
Moreover, the trials are monitored by international bodies, national 
governments and NGOs, so any potential abuse is almost impossible. 
However, a balancing test should be made to ensure the rights of the 
accused and that anonymity is reserved only for those cases where the 
victim or witness will be placed in significant danger by testifying.  
Another issue that required attention during sexual violence trials is the 
treatment of victims by the court and everyone involved in the case. Trials 
in cases of sexual violence can be very traumatizing for the victims, 
especially when they testify, are interrogated or have to confront the 
perpetrator. Defence attorneys often ask excessive or inappropriate 
questions (like unnecessary details of the rape) to upset the victim and make 
her look like an unreliable witness. Other tactics are to damage the victim’s 
credibility by focusing on her prior use of contraceptives, abortions or 
suggesting they consented. The defence attorney asked one witness, who 
was not selected to be raped one night, if she was jealous of those who were 
chosen.
524
 Defence attorneys also focus on the fact that victims have been 
heavily traumatized, suggesting that they make unreliable witnesses due to 
their trauma. However, both the Kunarac and Furundžija Trial Chambers 
rejected such claims, stating that sexual violence victims can be reliable 
witnesses, even when they suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder.
525
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Generally, the ICTY has decisively squashed factual and legal submissions 
by the defence which were considered untenable. An example of such 
untenable claims that were rejected by the Trial Chambers was the argument 
by Kovač, an accused in the Kunarac case, who claimed the alleged victim 
was actually in love with him and sent him love letters.
526
 Another example 
was the claim by Kunarac himself that one of the victims instigated sexual 
conduct herself. The Trial Chamber found it was highly improbable that 
Kunarac could genuinely have been confused by the behaviour of the girl 
given the general context of the existing situation, especially as she was in 
captivity and in fear for her life.
527
 Another problematic issue for victims 
can be self-representation of the accused in sexual violence cases. In the 
Stanković case, the Trial Chamber rejected the request of the accused for 
self-representation, by noting, inter alia, that it would be inappropriate for 
the accused to cross-examine witnesses who are alleged victims of the 
crimes he had been charged with.
528
  
Another important issue for the prosecution of sexual crimes before 
international criminal tribunals is the need for adequate representation of 
women at all levels, not only as judges but also as Prosecutors. This issue 
will ensure that an adequate level of sensitivity towards victims is 
established and that sexual violence crimes are adequately investigated, 
prosecuted and judged. Certainly there is a strong argument to use more 
women as investigators and interpreters “in order to create a sense of 
intimacy and trust that is conducive to helping victims feel comfortable 
enough to share their stories with investigators.”529 
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12. Conclusion 
Throughout history, most of the sufferings that women were subjected to 
during armed conflicts were not designated as international crimes. And 
when they have been criminalized, they were disproportionately omitted 
from efforts to enforce the law and to punish those who violate it. One only 
needs to look at the non-prosecution of crimes against women during World 
War II for an example. Even more generally, violence against women was 
for a long time considered a private or a family matter, where national or 
international actions are not appropriate. Therefore, domestic violence, 
mutilation and abuse of women were ignored, the perpetrators remained 
unpunished and the victims forced to suffer in silence. Indeed, this situation 
persists in certain parts of the world. 
Thankfully, however, things have started changing as a reaction to the 
atrocities and widespread sexual violence crimes that occurred during the 
armed conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where rape and 
other sexual violence crimes were used as weapons of war, in order to 
terrify the civilian population, traumatize women, destroy families and 
communities, all with the intention of performing ethnic cleansing or 
genocide. 
The international community recognized this and received strong support 
for adequately prosecuting sexual violence crimes. Especially in the ICTY, 
it set out from the beginning to deal with sexual violence crimes against 
women, although these crimes are difficult to prove and prosecute. As there 
are often no witnesses besides the victim and the perpetrator, the victims are 
often too traumatized or ashamed to admit they were raped or they do not 
wish to testify for fear of retribution. Nonetheless, the ICTY and the ICTR 
have made a great contribution to a better understanding of women’s 
perspectives and experiences in international criminal law and shown that 
such atrocities must be dealt with decisively.  
The ICTR and ICTY established the first definitions of rape in international 
criminal law through Akayesu and Kunarac, cases which were considered as 
groundbreaking in prosecution of sexual violence crimes against women. 
Moreover, in these and other cases the ICTY and ICTR have clearly 
established that rape and sexual violence crimes can constitute torture and 
genocide. The ICTY in Kunarac also became the first tribunal to prosecute, 
although indirectly as enslavement, the crime of sexual slavery. 
Therefore, the ICTY and ICTR have had a crucial role in advancing 
prosecution of gender-based crimes against women in international criminal 
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law and in re-conceptualizing many crimes from a gender-perspective. 
These two ad hoc tribunals have also greatly influenced the creation of the 
ICC, which goes even further in advancing the prosecution of gender-based 
crimes against women, at least on paper. The Rome Statute became the first 
instrument in international criminal law to expressly criminalize the crimes 
of enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced sterilization, which 
had never previously been criminalized or prosecuted in international 
criminal law. It remains to be seen, however, whether this advancement on 
paper will be matched by the ICC’s jurisprudence in practice. The SCSL, 
based largely on the ICC, has also contributed to the advancement of 
international criminal law in this regard as it became the first international 
criminal tribunal to prosecute forced marriage as a distinct crime. However, 
it seems that such practice will not be followed by the ICC, which has 
instead chosen to prosecute forced marriage as sexual slavery. 
However, even with the amplitude of formal sanctions established by 
international law, there have been claims that this body of law has not done 
enough to address the issue of gender-based violence. That being said, the 
role of international criminal tribunals must be noted as an important means 
of fighting impunity for these crimes, ensuring their recognition and 
formulating a reaction. Even if there is just a small number of perpetrators 
tried in international criminal tribunals, in comparison to the large number 
of low level individual perpetrators, such prosecutions in international 
criminal tribunals can symbolically facilitate a better understanding of 
women’s sufferings in war and over time attempt to ensure that women are 
better protected from the atrocities of war. 
However, even more can and should be done, especially when it comes to 
the role and satisfaction of victims. International criminal tribunals generally 
only prosecute the most responsible persons for atrocities in armed conflicts, 
those on higher positions or those in command. That means that thousands 
of low-level perpetrators remain free, living in impunity for their acts, 
sometimes in the same area as their victims. More should be done to punish 
as many of these perpetrators as possible and show that even low-level 
soldiers cannot act with impunity. While this is, of course, difficult to 
achieve under international law, more effort should be given to supporting, 
training and assisting national jurisdictions in their efforts to investigate and 
prosecute these crimes. The ICTY, for example, has attempted such 
measures and has achieved, in general, strong cooperation with national 
criminal courts in Former Yugoslavia. This was established through the 
transfer of cases to national courts and the provision of training for how 
these crimes should be prosecuted. 
 122 
Regardless of national courts, however, possibilities of reparation should 
also be made more available and efficient in international criminal tribunals 
as well. The ICTY and the ICTR do provide for reparation possibilities for 
victims. However, with the exception of the ICTR Support Programme for 
Witnesses, the reparation mechanisms have generally been neither enforced 
nor adjusted to provide adequate remedies to victims, and victims of sexual 
violence have largely been left uncompensated, while many have already 
died.  
Therefore, this area needs to be further and constantly improved in order for 
a large number of victims to feel in practice more than just the symbolic 
value of international criminal law. It will be interesting to see how the case 
law of the ICC will develop in this regard and whether it will manage to 
offer more protection to victims of sexual violence crimes. 
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